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Abstract 
Various formal theories have been proposed in the literature to capture the notions of diagnosis 
underlying diagnostic programs. Examples of such notions are: heuristic classification, which is 
used in systems incorporating empirical knowledge, and model-based iagnosis, which is used 
in diagnostic systems based on detailed domain models. Typically, such domain models include 
knowledge of causal, structural, and functional interactions among modelled objects. In this paper, 
a new set-theoretical framework for the analysis of diagnosis is presented. Basically, the framework 
distinguishes between ‘evidence functions’, which characterize the net impact of knowledge bases 
for purposes of diagnosis, and ‘notions of diagnosis’, which define how evidence functions are to 
be used to map findings observed for a problem case to diagnostic solutions. This set-theoretical 
framework offers a simple, yet powerful tool for comparing existing notions of diagnosis, as 
well as for proposing new notions of diagnosis. A theory of flexible notions of diagnosis, called 
refinement diagnosis, is proposed and defined in terms of this framework. Relationships with notions 
of diagnosis known from the literature are investigated. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights 
reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
Diagnostic computer programs were among the first systems developed in the field 
of applied Artificial Intelligence. In the burgeoning field of expert systems in the 1970s 
and 198Os, diagnostic applications abound. Although these systems frequently dealt 
with similar, or related, problem domains, often their underlying principles differed 
considerably. In a sense, this was a consequence of the additional goal of the development 
of many of these, now classic, programs: to explore representation and problem-solving 
methods. Only after researchers experienced that developing reliable diagnostic systems 
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was much more difficult than previously thought, it was recognized that the principles 
underlying diagnosis were actually poorly understood. 
Starting about halfway through the 1980s a significant amount of research on conceptual 
and formal aspects of diagnosis was undertaken, with the aim of acquiring more 
insight into the nature of diagnostic problem solving. For example, Chandrasekaran and 
colleagues have analysed the diagnostic process conceptually in terms of a small number 
‘generic problem-solving tasks’ [6]. Instead of studying the problem-solving behaviour of 
diagnostic systems, other researchers have focussed on representation issues in diagnostic 
systems. Where in many early diagnostic systems diagnostic knowledge from experts was 
captured in the form of empirical classification rules [4], in later systems model-based 
approaches became increasingly popular for building diagnostic systems in both industrial 
(cf. [2,14]), and nonindustrial areas, such as medicine (cf. [19,40]). The model-based 
approach advocates the construction of knowledge-based systems based on explicit models 
of a problem domain. For example, such models describe the structural and functional 
interactions among components of a physical system, or the causal interactions among 
elements in a domain. Model-based diagnosis was, in fact, already explored in the early 
systems INTER [17], SOPHIE [3], CASNET [43], and ABEL [27]. 
Although the introduction of the model-based approach to building diagnostic applica- 
tions had a significant impact on the field of diagnosis, it did not immediately provide deep 
insight into the process of diagnosis. Real fundamental understanding of the nature of the 
diagnostic process was yielded by subsequent research concerning the formal aspects of 
diagnosis. 
An early formal theory of diagnosis was proposed by Reggia and colleagues in terms 
of set theory, called set-covering theory, or parsimonious covering theory [35]. Basically, 
in the set-covering theory of diagnosis, causal knowledge of abnormality is represented 
by means of a binary causal relation, which is employed for computing diagnoses, 
essentially by determining whether actually observed findings can be predicted using the 
causal relation. Subsequent work has yielded several algorithms to compute set-covering 
diagnoses efficiently in practical applications [29,38,44], although this type of diagnostic 
reasoning is known to be NP-hard in general [5]. Experimental studies of set-covering 
theory and its variants have been performed by several researchers [21,34,41]. 
The formal aspects of diagnosis employing causal knowledge have also been studied, 
using logic as the primary tool [ 11,13,30,32]. In the logical theory of abductive diagnosis, 
diagnosis is formalized as reasoning from effects to causes, with causal knowledge 
represented as logical implications of the form 
causes + effects 
where causes are usually abnormalities or faults, but they may also include normal 
situations. This abductive type of reasoning is contrasted with deduction, which for 
implications of the form above and under certain conditions, like that given causes and 
effects are conjunctions of positive literals, would amount to reasoning from causes to 
effects. Because in set-covering theory causal relations are also exploited to find causes 
for certain observed findings, this theory may be viewed as a specific theory of abductive 
diagnosis as well. The logical theory of abductive diagnosis is more expressive than set- 
covering theory, because it is possible to explicitly represent various types of interaction, 
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which is not possible in the original set-covering theory. For example, it is not possible 
to express in the original set-covering theory that the simultaneous occurrence of two 
or more causes leads to the masking of certain findings. Console and colleagues have 
proposed several different versions of abductive diagnosis [9,11], and have also developed 
an implementation of the theory as the CHECK system [40]. Poole and colleagues have 
investigated abductive diagnosis using Theorist, a theory and system for hypothetical 
reasoning [30-321. 
Approximately at the same time, Reiter proposed yet another logic-based theory of 
diagnosis, aiming at formally capturing diagnosis of abnormal behaviour in a device or 
system, using a model of normal structure and behaviour [36]. Nowadays, Reiter’s theory, 
which was later extended by de Kleer and colleagues to deal with knowledge of both 
normal and abnormal behaviour [ 181, is usually referred to as the theory of consistency- 
based diagnosis. Basically, consistency-based diagnosis amounts to finding faulty device 
components that account for a discrepancy between predicted normal behaviour of a 
device, possibly supplemented with predictions of abnormal behaviour, both according to 
a domain model, and actually observed behaviour. The discrepancy is formalized as logical 
inconsistency; a diagnosis is established when assuming particular components to be faulty 
and others to be normally functioning restores consistency. 
The abductive and consistency-based theories of diagnosis are often contrasted with 
diagnosis based on empirical associations. When empirical associations are represented as 
logical implications, then viewed as a classification relation, establishing a diagnosis can 
be accomplished by logical deduction, computing the closure of this classification relation. 
The more procedurally oriented term heuristic clusszjkation is frequently employed to 
refer to this type of diagnostic reasoning [8]. 
It has been shown that abductive and consistency-based diagnosis can be mapped to 
each other [36]. Furthermore, both types of diagnosis can be defined, in slightly different 
ways, in terms of the logical entailment relation [ 12,331. Hence, although it was once 
thought that diagnostic systems could be classified as being either based on consistency 
checking, abductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, or on a combination of these three 
types of reasoning, it appears that characterizing diagnostic systems is more complicated 
than that [26]. 
The conclusion that there is not a unique way to characterize a particular type of 
diagnosis raises questions concerning the assumptions underlying abductive diagnosis, 
consistency-based diagnosis and heuristic classification. Does the logical notion of 
consistency provide an appropriate basis for formalizing various notions of diagnosis, and 
similarly, is logical implication the proper way to formalize relationships between causes 
and effects in abductive diagnosis, and to formalize empirical associations in heuristic 
classification? In this paper, it is argued that the formalization of diagnosis will benefit from 
the modelling of interactions at two levels of specification: (1) the modelling of interactions 
between the presence or absence of defects or faults, expressed by a mapping from defects 
to observable findings, and (2) the modelling of an interpretation of observed findings 
in the context of such a mapping. A set-theoretical semantic framework to express these 
aspects of diagnosis is proposed in Sections 2 and 3, and examined in detail in Section 4 
using known theories of diagnosis from the literature. Medicine and simple logic circuits 
are taken as example domains. 
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As in many other theories of diagnosis, diagnostic problem solving is viewed as a 
special instance of hypothetical reasoning [3 I], possibly producing multiple, competing 
diagnoses. In solving a diagnostic problem, a hypothesis concerning the presence or 
absence of faults or abnormal processes, such as disorders in medicine, is first generated 
and next tested with respect to diagnostic knowledge and observed findings, yielding 
diagnoses that are best in a particular sense. However, since the result of this paper 
is a mathematical framework, no particular problem-solving order is enforced. The set- 
theoretical framework is expressive enough to go beyond common notions of diagnosis. 
This point is illustrated by the development of a theory of flexible diagnosis in Section 5, 
called rejinement diagnosis, which is defined in terms of this framework. Relationships 
with notions of diagnosis known from the literature are investigated. 
2. Interactions among defects and observables 
There exists a strong relationship between the suitability of a particular type of 
knowledge for building a diagnostic system and the nature of the underlying problem 
domain. For example, for the construction of medical diagnostic systems, knowledge of 
the pathophysiology of disease processes can be used, but in other medical domains, like 
neurology, diagnostic problem solving mainly relies on the description of normal function, 
in combination with knowledge of the anatomical structure of the human body [24]. 
Similarly, in technical domains, knowledge of the structure of a device, supplemented with 
knowledge of how particular components are expected to behave normally or abnormally, 
can be used for the purpose of diagnosis [15]. Despite such differences, any knowledge 
base of a diagnostic system incorporates representations of meaningful interactions among 
defects (faults or disorders) and observable findings. We shall examine a number of typical 
examples of diagnostic knowledge bases to illustrate these points. 
2.1. Motivating examples 
Frequently employed types of knowledge encoded in diagnostic systems are causal 
knowledge, knowledge of structure and functional behaviour, and empirical associations. 
A small, but typical, example of each of these types of knowledge is presented 
below. 
Causal interactions. Consider the following piece of medical knowledge: “influenza 
causes fever and infection of the trachea and bronchial tree (tracheobronchitis), which 
causes a sore throat; if the patient suffers from asthma, shortness of breath (dyspnoea) 
will occur as well”. In Fig. 1 (a), the directed-graph representation of the causal knowledge 
embodied in this medical description is depicted, where an arc denotes a cause-effect 
relationship. The medical meaning ascribed to the elements in the causal graph is indicated 
in Fig. l(b). Using logic as our representation language, the figure may be assumed to 
correspond to a causal specijcation C = (A, @, R), where A = (dl, d2, d3) denotes a set 
of disorders, @ = { ft , f2, f3] denotes a set of observable findings, and ‘R is a collection of 
rules in propositional logic: 
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Meaning 
dl: influenza 
- dz: tracheobronchitis 
_ d3: asthma 
jr: fever 
f2: sore throat 
fa: dyspnoea (shortness of breath) 
(b) 
Fig. 1. Causal net 
dl + & 
4 + fi 
dz + A 
&A&+f3. 
Such a causal specification is typically used in abductive diagnosis based on logic [9,32]. 
Note that the disorders dl and d2 are causally related to each other; causal interaction 
is expressed by logical implication. A causal specification can be used for predicting 
observable findings. Assuming the presence of certain disorders, e.g., influenza (dl), 
R U {dl ) b (fl , fz) expresses that a patient with influenza will have symptoms and 
signs of fever (fl) and sore throat (f2) via a causal mechanism, where b denotes 
standard logical entailment. Here, the interaction between disorders, and between disorders 
and observable findings, is monotonic, due to the monotonic nature of ordinary logical 
entailment: by assuming more disorders, more observable findings will be predicted. 
Below, we shall consider various desirable nonmonotonic interactions, and also the 
qualitative representation of uncertain relationships between a cause and its associated 
effects. 
Functional behavioux Knowledge of normal and abnormal functional behaviour can be 
effective for diagnosing device problems, where the behaviour of the device is described in 
terms of relationships between input and output signals. These relationships are obtained 
from knowledge of the behaviour of the device’s components and of the way in which 
these components are interconnected, i.e., the structure of the device. Consider a logic 
circuit consisting of an XOR (exclusive OR) gate X and an AND gate A, as shown in Fig. 2. 
The three input signals to the circuit are indicated by 11, I2 and 13; Or and 02 denote the 
two output’signals. 
Following the approach in [18], the normal behaviour of the two components can be 
described by the following two logical implications: 
VX( (XORG(x) A -Abnormal(x)) + out(x) =xor(inl(x), in2(x))) 
Vx((ANDG(x) A -Abnormal(x)) + out(x) = and(inl(x), in2(x))) 
supplemented with the atoms XORG(X) and ANDG(A), which represent the XOR gate 
X and the AND gate A, respectively (uppercase symbols like X and A indicate constant 
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Fig. 2. Logic circuit 
symbols). If we assume that a defective gate always produces an output signal that is 
different from the correct output signal, the following logical specification of abnormal 
behaviour is obtained: 
Vx ((XORG(x) A Abnormal(x)) + out(x) # xor(inl(x), in2(x))) 
Vx ((ANDG(x) A Abnormal(x)) + out(x) # and(inl(x), i?z2(x))). 
The structure of the circuit can be described by a collection of equalities, which also 
indicates how components influence each other, as follows: 
out(X) = in1 (A) in2(A) = 13 
inl(X) = I1 out(X) = Or 
in2(X) = 12 out(A) = 02. 
Now, a system S is defined as a pair S = (SD, COMPS), consisting of a system description 
SD, such as the logical specification of the structure and behaviour of the circuit given 
above, with a set of components COMPS, with COMPS = (X, A) in the present case. 
Such a specification is typically used in consistency-based iagnosis. 
Suppose that the input to the circuit is as follows: Zr = l,Z2 = 0 and 13 = 1. Using 
standard logical entailment, the following output can be predicted, assuming that the circuit 
is functioning correctly: 
SD U {II = l,Z2 = O,Z3 = 1, -Abnormal(X), -Abnormal(A)} 
b { 01= 1,02 = 1). 
Similarly, partially abnormal behaviour, assuming part of the components to be abnormal, 
or completely abnormal behaviour can be predicted. 
Empirical associations. Empirical associations represent knowledge derived-from expe- 
rience, and usually have the intended meaning of classification rules. Let Z? = (A, @, 72’) 
denote an associational speci$cation corresponding to the causal medical knowledge de- 
picted in Fig. 1; the corresponding set of associational ogical rules R’ is defined as follows: 
fi +4 
fi + 4 
fi A A -+ 4 
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Fig. 3. Associations 
which can also be depicted as a directed graph, as shown in Fig. 3. Here, logical implication 
is interpreted as a classification relation; e.g., R’ U (f2, A} b (d2, d3). i.e., sore throat and 
dyspnoea are classified as being due to the presence of tracheobronchitis together with 
asthma. Logical classification relations are typically used in heuristic classification. 
Above, both the terms ‘disorder’ and ‘fault’ were used to refer to malfunction. Since 
the term ‘disorder’ is not used in technical domains, and the term ‘fault’ is not used in the 
biomedical domain, the term ‘defect’ will be used henceforth to denote both disorders in 
medicine and faults in technical devices. 
2.2, The interpretation of knowledge as evidence 
As has been illustrated above, diagnostic systems may incorporate a wide variety of 
knowledge. In fact, in addition to the types of knowledge explored in the examples above, 
many other types of knowledge that are useful in a diagnostic setting can be distinguished. 
When building a particular diagnostic system, decisions concerning the type of knowledge 
to be included are clearly important. However, diagnostic systems also have a number of 
features in common: these features are particularly relevant when comparing systems. It 
appears that all diagnostic systems incorporate knowledge of interactions among defects 
and observable findings, which can be captured by means of particular mappings. These 
mappings, called ‘evidence functions’ in this paper, will be shown to offer a precise 
interpretation of the significance of the knowledge available to a system for the purpose 
of diagnosis, and will be introduced below. 
Let A denote a countable set of assumptions concerning defects and possibly also con- 
cerning observable findings, as sometimes necessary for the representation of functional 
behaviour. Let @ be a countable set of findings. To be able to make a distinction between 
present and absent defects and findings, respectively, a negation function T is introduced. 
Positive defects d (findings f) and negative defects -d (findings 7 f) denote present de- 
fects (findings) and absent defects (findings), respectively. It is assumed that the law of 
double negation holds, i.e., ‘(lx) = X, for a defect or finding x. If a defect OT finding is 
not included in a set, it is assumed to be unknown. Let Ap (@p) denote a set of positive 
defects (findings), and let L\N (@,v) denote a set of negative defects (findings), such that 
Ap (@p> and AN (@N) are disjoint. It is assumed that A = AN U Ap and @ = @p U 4’~. 
Often a set of assumptions A and a set of findings @ will be disjoint, in which case A 
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merely consists of defects. To ease the exposition, this will be assumed in the following, 
unless stated otherwise. The power set of a set S is denoted by 8 (S). As a matter of conve- 
nience, members of AN are frequently denoted by -d, where -(-d) = d E Ap. Similarly, 
members of the set @N are denoted by 1 f, where again -(-f) = f E @p. 
The intended diagnostic meaning of a knowledge base of a diagnostic system in terms 
of defects and findings is called a diagnostic specification. It is formally introduced 
below. 
Definition 1 (Diagnostic speci’cation). A diagnostic specijcation C is a triple .E = 
(A, @, e), where e is a function 
called an evidence function, such that: 
(1) for each f E Sp there exists a set D C A with f E e(D) or -f E e(D) (and possibly 
both); 
(2) for each D C A: if d, -d E D then e(D) = I; 
(3) for each D, D’ c A: if e(D) # J_ and D’ C D then e(D’) # 1. 
If e(D) # I, it is said that e(D) is the set of observabZe_findings for D, and D is consistent; 
otherwise, it is said that D is inconsistent. 
The set e(D) stands for the set of observable findings for a set D of simultaneously 
occurring (present or absent) defects. In terms of diagnostic problem solving, the set e(D) 
consists of findings that may be interpreted in some way as ‘evidence’ for the occurrence 
of the set of defects D, depending on the findings actually observed. How an evidence 
function may be used for diagnosing a problem is discussed in Section 3; in this section, 
we confine ourselves to investigating the meaning of evidence functions. 
According to the definition above, we may have that both f E e(D) and -f E e(D), 
which simply means that these findings may alternatively occur given the combined 
occurrence of the defects in the set D, i.e., both f and -f are associated with D. In 
some domains it might hold that if e((d)) = e({d’}), it follows that d = d’, i.e., the defects 
d and d’ are taken as synonyms for the same defect. For example, if the defects stand for 
disorders in medicine, then two different names d and d’ for which the equality holds, 
would normally be taken as different names for the same disorder. This situation is quite 
common in medicine. In general, sets of observable findings associated with defects may 
have several findings in common; thus, the sets e(D) and e(D’), D # D’, need not be 
disjoint. 
As indicated in Definition 1, a set of defects may be inconsistent just because it holds 
that d, -d E D. This is a form of inconsistency that is evident for syntactic reasons. 
However, it is also possible that D is inconsistent for other than syntactic reasons, for 
example, because D contains defects d and d’ that are incompatible. In this situation, the 
inconsistency is a consequence of a semantic relationship between the defects d and d’. In 
several definitions, it will be convenient to consider only sets of defects that are consistent 
for syntactic reasons; hence, the following definition: 
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Definition 2 (Syntactic consistency). Let E = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic specification, then 
the set of defects D C A is called syntactically consistent if for each defect d E D: -d $ 
D; otherwise, D is called syntactically inconsistent. 
Next, the notion of maximal syntactic consistency is introduced; it is employed in the 
following to define particular evidence functions. 
Definition 3 (Maximal syntactic consistency). Let Z = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic specifi- 
cation, then the set of defects D C A is called maximally syntactically consistent if D is 
syntactically consistent and there exists no d E A, d $! D, such that D U {d} is syntactically 
consistent. 
Sometimes, a knowledge base is only examined with respect to a hypothesis H, a subset 
of the entire set of defects A. For this purpose, the following definition is introduced, 
Definition 4 (Restricted evidencefunction). Let C = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic specifica- 
tion. A restricted evidencefunction of e with respect to a set H s A, denoted by elH, is a 
function 
q~:@W)-=@(@)UI~J 
such that for each D C H: elH(D) = e(D). 
From a general point of view, the expressive power of evidence functions is as large 
as infinite propositional logic; the function e may be viewed as similar to the conjunctive 
normal form of propositional formulae with defects and findings as literals. For example, 
the evidence-function representation of an implication (dl A dz) -+ (fl v A) would 
yield, among other function values, e((dl, d2, -fl}) = (f2). (Note that the argument 
{dl, d2, -fl) is allowed, because A and @ need not be disjoint.) Hence, an evidence 
function is expressive enough to capture the sort of knowledge as represented in the logic 
theories of diagnosis, as introduced in Section 2.1. Consider the following example: 
Example 5. Reconsider Fig. 1 and the associated logical specification of causal knowl- 
edge in Section 2.1. The following diagnostic specification C = (A, 0, e), where Ap = 
(dl, d2, Q) and Cpp = {fl, f2, f3), corresponds to this causal specification. The intended 
meaning of this causal specification with respect to diagnosis can be captured by means of 
an evidence function e for which, among others, the following holds: 
e(M)) =IfItA) e(W3)) =0 
c(Vz)) = Cf2) e((d2, &I) = u2> f3) 
e(M, d21) = e(Ml) e(M,d2,d31) =e(M,d31) =ifl,f2,f31 
e((dt, -d2, d31) = 1. 
The property e((di)) C e({dl, dz}), i = 1,2, formally expresses that the interaction 
between dl and d2 is monotonic; the evidence function e is monotonically increasing. 
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The value e({&, -d2, d3)) = I indicates an impossible situation, because if dl is present, 
then d2 cannot be absent (though, it may be unknown); {dl, -d2, d3} is inconsistent for 
semantical reasons. The evidence function e actually extends the logic specification in 
Section 2.1, by assuming that the specification is also intended to deal with negative 
defects. 
The reader has probably noticed that the evidence function above can be specified more 
tersely; in Section 2.4 techniques for the partial specification of evidence functions will be 
discussed in detail. 
For a diagnostic system incorporating knowledge of structure and of normal or abnormal 
behaviour, the following diagnostic specification is obtained. 
Example 6. Reconsider the logic circuit depicted in Fig. 2, with the associated system S 
provided in Section 2.1. Suppose that presence of a defect in X is denoted by x; absence 
of a defect in X is denoted by -x. A similar notation is employed with respect to gate 
A. If Zj = 1, this will be denoted by ij ; an input equal to Zj = 0 will be denoted by 
‘ij . A similar convention is adopted for the output signals ok. Fixed input signals to the 
circuit are il, +2 and is. Now, the output signals are represented as observable findings, 
and a component for which the presence or absence of a defect is unknown, is taken into 
account by assuming that the component is either defective or nondefective. The following 
evidence function (only values for consistent sets of defects are provided) corresponds to 
the description above: 
e’({x, aI) = I-o1,~21 
e’({-x, u}) = (01, -021 
e’({x, -aI) = I-01, ~2) 
e’({-x, -aI) = {01,02) 
e’(b)) = {-oi,oz, -021 
e’(l-xl) = {01,02,7021 
e’((al) = Iol, -01,02, -021 
= e’({-a)) 
= e’(0). 
For example, e’({x}) = (701,02,~02) indicates that when the XOR gate X is defective, 
and it is unknown whether or not the AND gate A is defective, then the first output signal 
01 = 0 and the second output signal 02 may be either 0 or 1, depending on whether 
the AND gate is defective or not. Hence, e’({x}) is defined with respect to the output of 
the entire circuit in Fig. 2, not merely the output produced by the output channel directly 
connected to the XOR gate, i.e., 01. For this circuit in general, the observable findings 
for e’(D) always include or, 701, or both, and 02, -02, or both. In contrast with the 
assumptions underlying the evidence function given in Example 5, the behaviour of the 
system is described with respect to all elements of the entire system, and not in terms of 
isolated (defective) components. 
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The two examples above were meant to convey some intuition concerning the expressive 
power of evidence functions for capturing the semantical significance of knowledge for 
the purpose of diagnosis. One of the attractive features of evidence functions is that they 
provide an easy means for describing properties of diagnostic interpretations of knowledge 
bases in a precise, formal way. 
2.3. Properties of evidence&nctions 
As has been argued above, an evidence function e may possess certain properties, 
determined by the (diagnostic) knowledge incorporated in the knowledge base on which it 
is based. In this section, an overview is provided of properties of evidence functions that 
will be useful for characterizing diagnostic knowledge. Some of these properties will be 
required in the analysis of the various formal theories of diagnosis in Section 4. 
The various properties can be distinguished into global properties, i.e., properties that 
hold for the entire evidence function e, and local properties, i.e., properties that hold only 
for some sets of defects D. 
2.3.1. Global properties 
In descriptions of many problem domains, only positive findings, or positive findings 
and a few negative findings, are employed to characterize sets of defects. This situation 
has already been encountered in Example 5. By the definition of an evidence function 
(cf. Definition 1). any finding that is included in the set of findings @ must appear either 
positively, negatively, or both, in some function value e(D), D 5 A. This explains why 
from Definition 1 it follows that 
U e(D) = @ 
DCA,D consistent 
need not hold, because for some finding f E @, we may have that 1 f 6 e(D), for each 
D C A. Nevertheless, sometimes every positive and negative finding in @ is covered by 
the evidence function e. The consequence is that such an evidence function is, in principle, 
dependent on the notion of diagnosis employed, capable of producing a diagnosis for any 
set of findings observed (cf. Section 3). 
Monotonicity of an evidence function is a property that will be encountered several times 
in the analysis of theories of diagnosis in Section 4. It is defined as follows: 
Definition 7 (Monotonicity). Let _JC = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic specification. The 
evidence function e is called monotonically increasing if 
VD, D’ 5 A: D C D’ =+ e(D) E e(D’) 
and e is called monotonically decreasing if 
VD, D’ s A: D E D’ =+ e(D) 2 e(D’) 
with D and D’ consistent. If e is either monotonically increasing or decreasing, it is called 
monotonic; otherwise, e is called nonmonotonic. 
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If an evidence function is monotonically increasing, this means that the more defects 
are considered, the more (new) findings must be taken into account. The evidence 
function in Example 5, which was the result of the translation of causal knowledge into 
evidence-function representation, was monotonically increasing. If an evidence function 
is monotonically decreasing, this means that if more defects are considered, information 
concerning the observable findings of sets of defects will be more specific. We have 
encountered an example of such a function in Example 6, where knowledge concerning the 
normal and abnormal behaviour of a circuit was encoded. Note that what is often referred 
to as the ‘nonmonotonicity of diagnosis’ (cf. [36]) actually concerns the interpretation of 
observed findings in the process of diagnosis. This is an aspect completely different from 
the one considered in this section, but will be considered in Section 3. 
Of special interest in the previous section was the representation of interactions among 
defects and findings in terms of an evidence function. If no interactions among defects and 
findings exist (except inconsistency among syntactically inconsistent defects), the evidence 
function conforms to the following definition: 
Definition 8 (Interaction freeness). A set of defects A of a diagnostic specification C = 
(A, @, e) is called interaction free with respect to e if 
e(D) = U e(M) 
for each syntactically consistent set of defects D C A. If in addition for each d E A: e({d}) 
is nonempty, and for each d, d’ E A, d # d’, it holds that 
e(H) n e(td’l) = 0 
the set A is called strongly interaction free; otherwise, A is called weakly interaction,free. 
We will sometimes simply say that the evidence function e is interaction free. Interaction 
freeness means that the observable findings associated with a collection of defects D are 
the same as the collected observable findings associated with each individual defect d E D. 
Thus, by combining the observable findings for individual defects, the observable findings 
for combinations of defects are obtained. Although interaction freeness is presented here 
as a global property, we shall occasionally employ the phrase in a Zocal sense, to express 
that two or more defects do not interact with each other, e.g., e((d, d’]) = e({d}) U e({d’}). 
It is easy to show that an evidence function that is interaction free is also monotonically 
increasing. 
Proposition 9. If Z: = (A, @, e) is a diagnostic speciJcation, such that A is interaction 
free, then e is monotonically increasing. 
Proof. Simply note that if D C D’, with consistent sets D, D’ C A, then 
e(D’) = e(D U 0’) = U e({d]) = u e(fd}) U /J e({d]) = e(D) UefD’). 
dcDUD’ dcD deD’ 
From this, it follows that e(D) s e(D’). 0 
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As a matter of convenience, function values e({d}) of an evidence function that defines A 
to be interaction free, are sometimes simply denoted by e(d). If a set of defects is strongly 
interaction free with respect to some evidence function e, this does not necessarily imply 
that the defects do not influence each other in one way or the other; it only means that 
these influences have not been captured in the function e explicitly, because the meaning 
attached to e does make these influences irrelevant with respect to diagnosis. 
In some domains in which defects are interaction free, it holds that each defect is 
described in unique terms, i.e., for each defect d E A, the set of observable findings e(d) 
is not contained in the set e(D), if d is not included in D. It is shown that the evidence 
function restricted to consistent sets of defects is injective (the notation V\ W stands for 
the difference between the two sets V and W). 
Proposition 10. Let 22 = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic speci$cation such that A is interaction 
free with respect to e. Then, iffor each d E A, and each consistent set D g A\{d}, it holds 
that e((d}) g e(D), then the restriction of the evidencefunctions e to consistent subsets of 
A is injective. 
Proof. It has to be proven that for consistent D, D’ E A, with D # D’, it holds that 
e(D) # e(D’). If D # D’, then there exists a defect d E D (or d E D’ if D c D’, but 
reversing D and D’ does not matter), such that d 4 D’. Hence, according to the assumption 
of the proposition: e(d) sf e(D’). Since it holds by interaction freeness that e(d) 2 e(D), 
it follows, also from interaction freeness, that e(D) g e(D’). From this, the result follows 
immediately. u 
Given this proposition, the following corollary holds: 
Corollary 11. If C = (A, @, e) is a diagnostic specification such that A is strongly 
interaction free, then the restriction of the evidence function e to syntactically consistent 
sets of defects is injective. 
Proof. Simply note that if A is strongly interaction free, it holds that e({d}) 9 e(D\(d}) 
foreachDcA. q 
Proposition 10 is also satisfied if for each d E A, e(d) includes a unique observable 
finding (called a pathognomonic finding in medicine). Note that it is now possible to 
uniquely identify a set of defects D by its associated set of observable findings F = e(D), 
due to the injective nature of e (but the set of defects may also be undefined). This yields a 
very simple form of diagnosis. 
2.3.2. Local properties 
There are a number of local properties of evidence functions that are the result of 
mapping a semantic relationship among defects to relationships among sets of observable 
findings. A typical example of such a relationship is causality. For example, if the defect d 
is known to cause the defect d’, it is, in terms of the associated evidence function, known 
that the set of observable findings ford contains all observable findings associated with d’, 
i.e.. 
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e(W) c @I). (1) 
In a monotonic theory of causality (cf. [9,10]), the following would hold as well: 
e(M) = e(Id, d’]) (2) 
expressing that as d causes d’, when d and d’ are present together, precisely the same set 
of observable findings would be obtained as if only d was present and d’ is unknown. From 
(1) and (2) it follows that 
e({d, ’l) = e(H) U e(Id’l). 
Hence, d and d’ are assumed to be interaction free in the local sense; note that d and d’ 
are only weakly interaction free. This is not a global property of causality as employed in 
abductive diagnosis, because interaction freeness will not hold in general (cf. Example 5). 
Note that a causal specification C with a set of logical rules equal to 
is not distinguishable in terms of evidence functions from 
R’ = {dl f, d2, d2 f, f] 
because in both cases an interaction-free evidence function e with e((di}) = {f}, i = 
1,2, results. This means that ‘R and R’ are similar with respect to their diagnostic 
interpretation. 
Starting with causality in a more general sense, a number of local properties of evidence 
functions will be examined. 
(a) Influence interactions: the occurrence of some defects influences the occurrence of 
other defects, as reflected by the observable findings. The following two types of 
local interaction are distinguished: 
l CuusaZity: if the combination of defects D causes the set of findings F, then 
F = e(D). The diagnostic view of knowledge of the sort ‘the set of defects D 
causes the set of defects D” as, for example, used in abductive diagnosis can be 
made precise in terms of an evidence function as follows: 
e(D’) E e(D) 
for some consistent D, D’ s A, i.e., any finding that may be observed for the set 
of defects D’ may also be observed for the set of defects D. Furthermore, in this 
case it holds that 
e(D) = e(D U D’). 
In Example 5 above, simple causal relationships between three individual defects 
were examined. 
Various other types of causal relations can be expressed in terms of evidence 
functions. For example, the values of the evidence function 
e(Ml) = e({-41) = 63 
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Fig. 4. Nondeterministic causality. 
fori=1,...,3,and 
express nandeterministic causality between the defect dl on the one hand, and d2 
and d3, on the other hand, as depicted in Fig. 4. 
w Correlation: if the defects d and d’, d # d’, are correlated, then if d has occurred 
then d’ occurs as well, and vice versa, whereas if d is absent (-d), d’ is also 
absent c-d’), and vice versa. Correlation of defects can be described by means of 
an evidence function as follows: 
e(H) = @‘I) = e({d, d’j) 
e(I-dJ) = e((-d’]) = e({-d, -d’)) 
e({d, -d’]) = e({-d, d’}) = 1. 
The conditions above are satisfied for positive correlation; negative correlation 
can be described by means of the conditions 
e(H) = e((-d’)) = e((d, -d’}) 
e({-d}) = e((d’}) = e((-d, d’}) 
e([d, d’}) = 1. 
(b) Synonyms: if the defects d E A and d’ E A are synonymous, then e((d}) = e({d’}). 
This is commonly applied in medicine, as has been discussed above. If for each 
d, d’ E A, d # d’, it holds that e({d}) # e({d’)), there are no synonymous defects. It 
is said that A (also e) is synonym free. 
(c) Synergic interactions: these are interactions that augment, cancel, preclude, exclude, 
or complement local interactions among defects. The following types of interaction 
are distinguished: 
l Augmentation (also referred to as potentiation): the combined occurrence of two 
or more defects in the set D gives rise to new observable findings in addition to 
those associated with the individual elements, or proper subsets of D, i.e., 
e(D) 2 U e(D’) 
D'cD 
(3) 
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for some consistent D L A. It is interesting to note that (3) is yielded for 
monotonically increasing evidence functions, using the weaker condition: 
e(D) S? U e(o’). 
D'cD 
l Cancellation (also referred to asfault masking [ 151 or antagonism): the combined 
occurrence of two or more defects in the set D yields fewer observable finding 
when compared to the findings associated with the individual elements, or proper 
subsets of D, i.e., 
e(D) c U e(D’) 
D'cD 
for some consistent D G A. 
l Augmented cancellation: this notion combines the notions of augmentation and 
cancellation mentioned above, after weakening both conditions. The following 
holds: 
D'cD D'cD 
for some consistent D G A. For example, e({dl}) = (fl), e({dz}) = {f2, f3}, but 
e({dl, d2)) = {f3, f4); hence, the findings fl and f2 are cancelled, and a new 
finding (f4) is observable. Note that e({dl, d2)) o e(di), i = 1,2, fails to hold for 
o E {c, 2). This is a consequence of the dependence between augmentation and 
cancellation. The cancellation of findings causes augmentation to fail, and vice 
versa. Hence, the weakening of the two conditions in the notion of augmented 
cancellation. 
l Preclusion: the presence of one or more defects in a combination implies that 
each element in some other combination of defects is assumed to be absent. This 
can be expressed by: 
e(M , . . . , d,)) 2 e({-d;, . . . , -dk}). 
This means that a set of present defects contains information pertaining to a set 
of absent defects. Note that if A is interaction free, it follows that 
e(M, . . ,&I) 1 e({-dij) 
for each i, 1 < i 6 m, m 3 1. This yields a preclusion relation that is more easy 
to grasp, namely that a combination of defects D precludes some defect d: 
e(D) 1 e(-d). 
l Exclusion: some combination of defects D cannot occur: 
e(D) = 1. 
l Complementation: the observable findings associated with the absent defects 
-dl, . . . , -d,,, are the complements of those associated with the presence of 
those,i.e.,if e({dl, . . .,d,,)) = {fl,. .., fm) thene((-dl,. . .,-d,}) = {-fl,. ., 
-fInI. 
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(d) Empirical associations: when the defects in the set D are simultaneously present, 
the findings in the set F may be observed, given F = e(D). Knowledge based 
on empirical associations is often structured according to individual defects and 
families (categories) of defects; a defect d can be called more specific than a defect 
d’ if e({d}) c e((d’}); if this relation holds for more than one defect d, then defect 
d’ may be taken as a category (it includes a number of different defects). 
The evidence-function representations of causal knowledge and of empirical associ- 
ations have much in common, but there are a few differences. Firstly, the condition 
e(d) = e(d’) fails to hold for empirical associations if d and d’ are not synonymous. 
Secondly, a defect d for which e(d) > e(d’), for more than one defect d’ E A, will be 
a category if the evidence function e stands for empirical associations, but, d will not be a 
category in general if e represents causal knowledge. 
This concludes our list of various interactions among defects, and their expression in 
terms of evidence functions. 
2.4. Partial speci@ation 
When a domain satisfies certain properties, it may be sufficient to provide a partial 
specification of an evidence function. Partial specification has the virtue that it is not always 
necessary to explicitly specify, or compute, the exponential number of function values of 
an evidence function e; it suffices to provide only part of them explicitly. Any algorithm 
for diagnosis using an evidence function of the form discussed in the previous section, 
without simplifying assumptions, will be intractable. In [5], in which the complexity of 
algorithms for abductive diagnosis is analysed, it is therefore assumed that the specification 
of a domain theory is polynomial in the sum of the cardinalities of the sets A and CD. 
A partial specijkation of an evidence function e consists of a restriction of e, denoted by e”, 
which is defined on a nonempty subset V E Q (A), together with a number of computation 
rules expressing how function values e(D) must be determined. If an evidence function is 
defined by means of a partial specification, it is called partially specified. 
In domains for which not all function values e(D) can be provided explicitly, such as 
in medicine, the condition that the specification of an evidence function is polynomial 
in size is usually fulfilled, be it for pragmatic reasons. In biomedical applications there 
is usually insufficient knowledge available to explicitly capture all interactions among 
defects, because the medical literature provides little information about the observable 
features of specific disorder combinations. In technical applications, the situation is less 
unfavourable, in the sense that often precise technical descriptions of the domain are 
available. 
In several diagnostic theories, for example, the set-covering theory of diagnosis [29], 
partial specification includes a restriction of an evidence function to singleton sets, i.e., it 
suffices to define an evidence function in terms of the individual defects distinguished in 
the domain. If the associated computation rule expresses that the observable findings for 
nonsingleton sets of defects can be taken as the union of the observable findings associated 
with their elements, the evidence function is interaction free. This limitation is enforced 
by some formal theories of diagnosis; it may not be sanctioned by the characteristics of a 
problem domain, as we have seen in the previous section. 
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Although the extension of a partial specification to an evidence function is thus 
dependent on known evidence-function properties, expressed by means of computation 
rules, there are two extremes that deserve attention. The first useful way of partially 
specifying an evidence function is based on the assumption that when no explicit 
knowledge concerning the findings associated with a set of defects D is available, 
implicitly the largest proper subsets D’ of D for which Z(D’) is given, are taken to yield 
sufficient information concerning the interactions among the elements of D. This form of 
partial specification is called bottom-up partial specification. 
Definition 12 (Bottom-up partiuE specijcation). Let E = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic 
specification, and let V 5 go (A)\{0} b e a set, such that for each d E A: {d] E V. Then, a 
function 
e : v -+ @(CD) u (I] 
is called a bottom-up partial speci$cation of e if: 
(1) for each D E V: e(D) = Z(D); 
(2) for each D E p (A)\V: 
e(D) = U e(D’). 
D’cD, D’EV 
VD”cV, D”cD: D”dD’ 
Hence, by a bottom-up partial specification Z we mean a restriction of an evidence 
function e with appropriate computation rules to generate the function e from t?. The 
principal idea of condition (2) is illustrated in Fig. 5, where a node in the graph represents 
a set and an edge represents proper set inclusion; all nodes below the node labelled D 
in the graph are proper subsets of D. Note that a restriction 2 need not be unique; one 
can freely include subsets D of A in the domain of the restriction Z for which e(D) 
could also be determined using condition (2) in the definition above. The intuitive idea 
of a bottom-up partial specification is that information concerning the interaction among 
defects is derived from the largest (with respect to c) proper subsets D’ of a set of defects 
D, for which function values e”(D’) have explicitly been given; the function value e(D), 
when not explicitly given by 2, is obtained as the union of all such Z( D’). In the examples 
below this choice will be further clarified. For convenience, in the following, function 
values for syntactically inconsistent sets will be left out from the definition of bottom-up 
0 not included in V 
l 
included in V 
used for e(D) 
l 
included in V 
not used for e(D) 
Fig. 5. Part of a lattice used for bottom-up specification of an evidence function. 
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partial specifications 2. From the definition of a bottom-up partial specification it follows 
that e(0) = 0, i.e., there are no observable findings if there is no knowledge concerning 
defects. If the problem domain concerns the (faulty) behaviour of a device, a bottom-up 
partial specification amounts to specifying the isolated behaviours of parts of the device. 
Hence, a bottom-up partial specification is in line with a specification of causal knowledge 
as in the abductive theory of diagnosis, i.e., any diagnostic specification obtained from this 
theory can be described as a bottom-up partial specification. 
Often, the causal relation, such as represented by standard logical entailment, is taken 
to be monotonic. Bottom-up partial specifications, however, also allow for representing 
nonmonotonic interactions and complementary findings representing alternative observ- 
able findings, e.g., f and -f, thus extending the repertoire of the types of knowledge that 
can be used for diagnosis. 
Example 13. Consider a medical diagnostic problem, where a patient may have Gushing’s 
disease-a disease caused by a brain tumour producing hyperfunctioning of the adrenal 
glands-pulmonary infection and iron-deficiency anaemia. We shall not enumerate all 
signs and symptoms causally associated with these medical problems; it suffices to note 
that moon face is a sign associated with Cushing’s disease, fever and dyspnoea (shortness 
of breath) are associated with pulmonary infection, and low levels of serum iron are 
characteristic for iron-deficiency anaemia. However, in a patient in whom Cushing’s 
disease and pulmonary infection coexist there usually is no fever. This indicates that 
there exists an interaction between the two disorders, Cushing’s disease and pulmonary 
infection, that is nonmonotonic, i.e., the co-occurrence of the two disorders produces fewer 
findings than the union of their associated observable findings. Fig. 6(a) depicts this simple 
problem as a directed graph; the meaning of the nodes in the graph is indicated in Fig. 6(b). 
Consider a diagnostic specification Z: = (A, @, e), where e is bottom-up partially 
specified by means of the function 2, which is defined as follows: 
1 
t:;“’ ifD=IdlJ, 
if D = {dz), 
Z(D)= $,.fi) ifD=I&), 
k.62, f31 if D = Idly d2), 
0 ifD=(-di),i=l,..., 3. 
From this specification, it follows that e((dl)) 9 e((dr, d2)); e is nonmonotonic. Note the 
difference between Fig. 6, which is a representation of the function 2, and does not assume 
monotonicity, and the evidence-function interpretation of Fig. 1. Here, it does not hold that 
c(I4, d2)> = kfl, f2, f3). 
As a prerequisite for bottom-up partial specification, it is assumed that at least 
knowledge concerning individual defects (i.e., singleton sets of defects) is available 
in a given diagnostic domain. This is not an unrealistic assumption, because in many 
problem domains knowledge concerning the possible abnormal behaviour resulting from 
an individual defect is the kind of knowledge most readily available. 
Example 14. Consider again the evidence function from the example above (Example 13). 
From this partial specification it follows that, for example, e(Ap) = Z({dl, 4,)) UZ((d3)) = 
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4 .fl 
*ND .fz a d2 f3 d3 f4 Meaning dl: pulmonary infection &: Cushing’s disease &,: iron-deficiency anaemia fi: fever f2: dyspnoea (shortness of breath) f3: moon face 
f4: low serum iron 
(b) 
Fig. 6. Partial evidence function Z. 
(f2, f3, j”), where Ap = {dl, d2, d3). Note that neither .Z((dl}) nor Z({&)) play a role in 
determining e(Ap), because there is information available about the interaction between 
the defects dl and 4 by the function value e”({dl, d2)). This function value provides 
partial information about the mutual influences among the defects in Ap; more precise 
information about the possible interactions between the members of Ap is unavailable; 
hence, {dl , &} and {d3} are assumed to be free of interaction, but the defects dl and d2 are 
not. 
It follows that a bottom-up partial specification may provide information about the 
interaction between defects. In the extreme situation that no interaction between defects 
exists, it suffices to define a partial specification in terms of individual defects only. 
Proposition 15. If Z = (A, @,, e) is a diagnostic spec$cation, such that A is interaction 
free, then there exists a bottom-up partial specijication e” of e with domain 
V = {{d} ( d E A}. 
Proof. Note that if the domain of 2, V, is defined as above, conditions (1) and (2) in 
Definition 12 simplify to the definition of interaction freeness; hence, the evidence function 
can be defined as follows 
e(D) = U g(W) 
for each syntactically consistent set D C A. q 
The second typical form of a partial specification of an evidence function is obtained 
by providing at least explicit function values for maximally syntactically consistent sets 
D c A, and describing other combinations of defects D’ by taking associated observable 
findings of defects d 4 D into account. In the following example, this particular partial 
specification technique is introduced, using a diagnostic description of a logic circuit taken 
from [18]. 
Example 16. Consider the logic circuit depicted in Fig. 7, which consists of two NOT 
gates (or inverters) in series. In [18], the problem of diagnosing faulty behaviour of the 
Mi? Lucas /Artificial Intelligence 105 (1998) 295-343 315 
Fig. 7. Two NOT gates in series. 
given logic circuit is described for an input signal fixed to I = 0, denoted here by -i, 
with resulting output signals equal to 0 = 0, denoted by -0, or 0 = 1, denoted by 
o, respectively. Again, output signals correspond to observable findings. The following 
behavioural assumptions are made in [18]. If a NOT gate Ni is defective, denoted by ni, 
its output will be either 0, or the input to the gate is shorted (unmodified) to its output; 
lni designates that the NOT gate Ni is not defective. Given this information, the following 
restriction Z of e of a diagnostic specification .X = (A, @, e) can be defined (we have 





The complementary pair l-0, o) is the result of the assumption above that there are two 
different, nondeterministic types of abnormal behaviour. The function 2 is taken as a partial 
specification to generate e by assuming that e([n 1)) = {-a, o), etc., meaning that if it is 
unknown whether or not N2 is defective, the possible output of the circuit, given Nt to be 
defective, is { -0, 0). Thus, similar to Example 6, we have that 
Interestingly, this partial specification indicates that if the observed output signal is equal 
to o, either {-nt, n2) or (nt ,722) may be the case, which are precisely the diagnostic 
alternatives provided by de Kleer et al. However, it is not at all obvious from their example 
that for an output equal to -0, the set of defects (-nt, ~22) is a possibility as well. This 
information is immediately available from the evidence function e. 
This way of partially specifying an evidence function will be called top-down partial 
specification of an evidence function. A top-down partial specification is appropriate when 
it is not possible to describe defects with associated observable findings in isolation from 
other defects and associated findings, i.e., knowledge of the associated findings of the other 
defects, including their interaction, is needed to describe the defects. If the domain is a 
device, this assumption means that it is not possible to describe the (normal or abnormal) 
behaviour of a component in isolation from its environment. One could view the approach 
supported by top-down specification as a ‘holistic approach’, and the approach supported 
by bottom-up specification as a ‘reductionistic approach’. Top-down partial specification 
is defined below. 
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0 not included in V 
0 
included in V 
used for e(D) 
0 
included in V 
not used for e(D) 
Fig. 8. Part of a lattice used for top-down specification of an evidence function. 
Definition 17 (Top-down partial specification). Let C = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic 
specification, and let V C 8 (A)\{0} be a set, such that for each maximally syntactically 
consistent set D E A: D E V. Then, the function 
e: V--+&?(@)U{I) 
is called a top-down partial specijkation of e if: 
(1) for each D E V: e(D) = Z(D); 
(2) for each D E &YI (A)\V: 
e(D) = U e(D’). 
D’>D, D’consistenf D’EV 
VD”EV, D”>D: D”cD’ 
Note that e(D) is obtained by taking the union of all function values e( D’), where 
D’ E V is a minimal proper superset of D, and no set D” E V is smaller than D’. The 
principal idea is depicted in Fig. 8. In Examples 6 and 16, the behaviour of two logic 
circuits was studied using evidence functions that could have been generated by a top- 
down partial specification 2, with 
V = {Ia, xl, I-a, xl, {a, -xl, {-a, -xl} 
for Example 6 and 
for Example 16. The assumption underlying an evidence function defined in this way is 
that it is sufficient to describe a domain in terms of the observable findings associated with 
all maximally consistent combinations of defects in the domain. This means that if the 
domain is a device consisting of components that may be defective, information about the 
isolated behaviour of individual components of the system has not been supplied. If a set 
of defects is described in terms of this special case of a top-down partial specification, we 
shall say that it is externally described. 
Definition 18 (Externally described). Let X = (A, @, e) be a diagnostic specification. 
The set of defects A is called externally described with respect to e if there exists a top- 
down partial specification e” for e with domain V, where for each D E V: D is maximally 
syntactically consistent. 
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Note that if A is externally described with respect to e, the definition of the evidence 
function can be simplified as follows. For each consistent D C A: 
e(D) = u Z(D'). 
D’DD, D’EV 
Dhkstent 
It is easily shown that an evidence function for a set of defects that is externally described 
is monotonically decreasing. 
Proposition 19. If .E = (A, @, e) is a diagnostic specfication, such that A is externally 
described, then e is monotonically decreasing. 
Proof. If D G D’, with consistent D, D’ L A, then 





From this, it follows that e is monotonically decreasing. q 
Observe that top-down partial specification does not result in a significant reduction in 
the number of values to be specified for an evidence function, because if 1 A p 1 = n , at least 
2” function values have to be specified. 
Above, we have introduced two opposite ways to define evidence functions. Bottom-up 
partial specification appeared to be particularly suitable for generating evidence functions 
for defects among which a limited amount of interaction exists. By contrast, top-down 
partial specification is most suitable for generating evidence functions for defects which 
are strongly interrelated. As one would expect, there are also evidence functions that lie 
somewhere between these two extremes, suitable for representing particular real-world 
knowledge. 
3. Notions of diagnosis 
As has been discussed, an evidence function can be viewed as a semantic interpretation 
of a knowledge base, containing, for example, causal or functional knowledge, in terms of 
expected evidence for the combined occurrence of (present or absent) defects. To employ 
an evidence function for the purpose of diagnosis, it must be interpreted with respect to 
the actually observed findings. The interpretation of an evidence function and the observed 
findings that is adopted, can be viewed as a notion of diagnosis applied for solving the 
diagnostic problem at hand. 
More formally, let ‘P = (E, E) be a diagnostic problem, where E s @ is a set of 
observed findings; it is assumed that if f E E then 1 f # E, i.e., contradictory observed 
findings are not allowed. The set of observed findings E denotes findings that are present or 
absent at a given time. In contrast, the findings in the set of observable findings F = e(D), 
318 I? J. E Lucas / Art$cial Intelligence IO5 (1998) 295-343 
D 5 A, need not all be observed at the same time. Let Rx denote a notion of diagnosis R 
defined for suitable diagnostic specifications, and here applied to Z, then a mapping 
&z,e,H : PC@) -+ B (A) u (~1 
called a diagnostic function, will either provide a diagnostic solution for a diagnostic 
problem P, or indicate that no solution exists, denoted by u (undefined). Recall that H 
denotes a hypothesis, which is taken to be a set of defects (more generally, assumptions 
H E A), and elH denotes the restricted evidence function of e. A notion of diagnosis R is 
usually a partial function; it is only defined for diagnostic specifications satisfying certain 
requirements. 
Next, a diagnosis is defined as the result of applying a diagnostic function to a set of 
observed findings. 
Definition 20 (Diagnostic solution). Let P = (Z, E) be a diagnostic problem, with E E 
0 a set of observed findings. Let R be a notion of diagnosis. An R-diagnostic solution, or 
R-diagnosis for short, with respect to the set of defects H c A is defined as follows: 
In Fig. 9, the idea underlying the definition of a notion of diagnosis R and diagnostic 
solution to a diagnostic problem is illustrated schematically. 
The definition above is very unrestrictive; one reasonable restriction on the notion of 
diagnosis is obtained by assuming that for each nonempty E L @, and each nonempty, 
consistent set H 5 A, forwhich RE,~,* (E) = H’, with H’ # u, it holds that elH(H’)n E # 
0 if elH(H’) f; 0, i.e., at least one observed finding in E must be accounted for by the 
diagnosis Hf. The set of findings elH (H’) fl E is called the set of findings accounted 
for by H’. The condition that at least one finding must be accounted for simply means 





Fig. 9. Schema of notion of diagnosis, diagnostic problem and solution 
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with respect to the findings observed. This is a rather weak condition. Other, more precise 
constraints will be encountered below for specific notions of diagnosis. 
If application of the diagnostic function RE,~,~ yields as a result H’ = Rx,,,, (E), it is 
said that: 
(1) the hypothesis H is accepted if H’ = H; 
(2) the hypothesis H is rejected if H’ = u; 
(3) otherwise, the hypothesis H is said to be adjusted. 
Adjustment of a hypothesis indicates that not all defects in H have passed when the 
hypothesis was tested against E, i.e., the result H’ is taken as the adjusted version of 
the original hypothesis H. 
Note that it is possible that 
Rc.,,H (E) = Rz,elH, (E) 
for H # H’. 
Example 21. To demonstrate how the definitions above can be employed, consider a 
notion of diagnosis U, such that UC,~,~ (E) = H’ if it holds that H’ is the largest subset 
of H with elH(H’) c E; otherwise, H’ = u. This notion of diagnosis expresses that a 
diagnosis consists of a set of defects which, on the one hand, can account for at least 
part of all observed findings, and, on the other hand, every finding associated with the set 
of defects that is taken as a diagnosis has been observed. Furthermore, there is only one 
such maximal subset of the given hypothesis H. Now, reconsider the medical domain from 
Example 13 (Fig. 6) with H = {dl , d2) (pulmonary infection and Cushing’s disease). Some 
interesting diagnostic conclusions are: 
i.e., a patient with only fever and dyspnoea has pulmonary infection, UC,~,~ ({ft}) = U, 
i.e., there exists no diagnosis accounting for only fever as sign, and finally, 
In the first case, the hypotheses has been adjusted, in the second case, the hypothesis H is 
rejected, and in the last case, the hypothesis H has been accepted. 
This example demonstrates the flexibility of the approach. 
As remarked above, Definition 20 imposes very few constraints with respect to the 
properties that must be satisfied by a reasonable notion of diagnosis. One conceivable 
property that, however, usually fails to hold, is that a notion of diagnosis respects the 
evidence function e. 
Definition 22 (R respects e). Let R be a notion of diagnosis defined for the diagnostic 
specification Z = (A, @, e). It is said that R respects e if: 
(1) for each set of observed findings E C Cp, there exists a set H C A such that 
e(RzelH (E)) = E, and 
(2) for each consistent D E A, there exists a set H C A, such that Rz,~,~ (e(D)) = D 
and for each H’ 2 H: RX-~,“, (e(D)) = u. 
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This means that a function that is taken as the inverse of the evidence function e, 
which must be bijective (excluding inconsistent sets of defects and sets E 2 @ with 
complementary findings), is composed of function values Rz,~,~ (E), where the set H E A 
need not be fixed. Of course, the two conditions above will also hold if there exists a 
function Rc,~,” with fixed H that can be taken as the inverse. 
If a notion of diagnosis respects an evidence function, and, in addition, an evidence 
function is interaction free, the following proposition holds: 
Proposition 23. Zf R is a notion of diagnosis defined for the diagnostic specification 
.X = (A, @, e), where e is interactionfree, and R respects e, then 
Rz,e,H (E) = Rz,e,H (E’) U Rz,e,H (E”) 
for each set of observed$ndings E, E’ and E”, with E, E’, E” c @ and E = E’ U E”, and 
H c A. 
Proof. Since e is bijective if restricted to consistent sets of defects D, we know that there 
exist sets D, D’ and D” such that E = e(D), E’ = e(D’) and E” = e(D”), with E = 
E’U E”. Then, using the fact that e is interaction free: e(D) = e(D’)Ue(D”) = e(D’U D”). 
Therefore, D = D’ U D”, because e is injective. From the fact that R respects e it follows 
that 
RX+,, (E’) U RX,+,,, (E”) = RqH, (4D’l) U R+,,, (4D”l) 
= D’ U D” 
= QelH (e(D’ U D”)) 
= Rx,elH (E) 
for some consistent H, H’, H” 5 A. Furthermore, since R respects e and Rx,~,~ (E) = D 
it follows that e]H (D) = E (D 2 H holds by definition). Similarly, from Rx+,, (E’) = 
D’ we have f?lHl(D’) = E’. Moreover, because D’ c D it follows that D’ E H, 
hence elH(D’) = E’. Therefore, Rc,~,,,, (E’) = Rc,~,” (E’). Analogously, Rz+,, (E”) = 
Rz,e,H (E”). 0 
Hence, it turns out that if a notion of diagnosis R respects an interaction-free evidence 
function e, the set of observed findings can be partitioned, such that each subset can be 
accounted for separately by the same function RE,~,“. Note that if we have an evidence 
function e for which f, 1 f E e(D), for some D C A, then R cannot respect e, due to 
the fact that E cannot contain complementary findings, at least, if Rz+, (E) is to be 
interpreted as a diagnosis. 
A notion of diagnosis R provides the possibility to express interactions among defects 
and observed findings at the level of diagnosis, which we call dependencies. We may 
also have that a hypothesis can be split up into two subhypotheses, that can be examined 
independently, yielding a form of compositionality. More formally, we have the following 
definition: 
Definition 24 (Independence assumption). Let R be a notion of diagnosis. It is said that 
R fulfills the independence assumption if for each diagnostic specification .Z for which 
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Rc is defined, and for each pair of consistent sets of defects H, H’ C A and each set of 
observed findings E 2 @ it holds that 
RqH”H’ (E) = b,e,H C-Q U RE+,, (El 
with RE,~,~~~, W) # u. 
This means that the diagnostic solution with respect to the hypothesis H U H’ is obtained 
as the union of the solutions for the two separately examined hypotheses H and H’. As 
we shall see, for many notions of diagnosis described in the literature, in particular for 
abductive diagnosis and consistency-based diagnosis, the independence assumption fails 
to hold. 
Example 25. The following notion of diagnosis S is defined for diagnostic specifications 
C = (A, @, e), where the evidence function e is interaction-free. Let E 2 @ be a set of 
observed findings, then 
Xx,e,ry (E) = u H’ 
H’ G H, ep,(H’) E E 
for each consistent H C A. The intuitive idea underlying this notion of diagnosis is 
that only defects in a hypothesis H that have all their associated findings included as 
observed findings are admitted as part of a diagnosis; the least upper bound of accepted 
subhypotheses is taken as the most likely diagnosis. The independence assumption is 
satisfied for S, because any interaction-free evidence function is monotonically increasing, 
therefore, if e(D) 2 E, then e(D’) 2 E, D’ C D. 
Next, diagnostic monotonicity is defined for a notion of R-diagnosis; it is a property in 
line with the independence assumption. 
Definition 26 (Diagnostic monotonicity). A notion of diagnosis R is called diagnostically 
monotonic if for each diagnostic specification 22 for which Rz. is defined, each consistent 
set of defects H C H’, with H, H’ C A, and each set of observed findings E E @, it holds 
that if Rz,~,~ (0 # u, then R_Q,” (E) E Rc+,~, (E); otherwise, R is called diagnostically 
nonmonotonic. 
Diagnostic monotonicity of a notion of diagnosis means: the larger (with respect to G) 
the hypothesis investigated, the larger the diagnostic solution. Note that from diagnostic 
monotonicity, it follows that if H G H’, then e(Rc,e,,(E)) E e(Rc,e,,,(E)) if e is 
monotonically increasing. 
The following proposition states that any notion of diagnosis satisfying the independence 
assumption is diagnostically monotonic. 
Proposition 27. A notion of diagnosis R is diagnostically monotonic if the independence 
assumption is satisfied. 
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Proof. Let R be a notion of diagnosis, then for every diagnostic specification .E: if 
H G H’, with consistent H, H’ C A, and Rc,~,~ (E) # u, then Rc,~,~ (E) E Rx+,,(E), 
because Rc,~,~, (E) = RC,elH (E) U Rc.~,~,,~ (E). 0 
Independence and diagnostic monotonicity were introduced as properties of abductive 
diagnosis for the first time in [5]. 
In the next two sections, various notions of diagnosis are compared, and their diagnostic 
characteristics are explored. The two orderings defined below, will be employed frequently 
in such comparisons. 
Definition 28 (Restriction). Let R and R’ be two notions of diagnosis. Then, R is called a 
restriction of RI, denoted by 
if for each Z:, and for each H C A, and set of observed findings E E 0 it holds that: if 
RE,~,~(E) = H’, H’#u, then R;,,,“(E) = H’. 
Thus, if the restriction relation between two notions of diagnosis R and R’ holds, then 
the diagnoses resulting from the notion of diagnosis R are a subset of those resulting from 
R’ (for any legal diagnostic specification E). 
The notion of subdiagnostic relation is useful for characterizing the relative strictness in 
admitting defects to a diagnostic solution from notions of diagnosis. 
Definition 29 (Subdiagnostic relation). Let R and R’ be two notions of diagnosis. The 
notion of diagnosis R is called subdiagnostic to R’, denoted by 
if Rx,~,“(E) & R&,,,,(E) giventhat Rz,=,~(E), R&,,,,(E) #u,foreachE, andforeach 
H C A and set of observed findings E G @. 
We shall occasionally employ the same symbol i to denote that the diagnostic solutions 
of some diagnostic function are a subset of those of another diagnostic function applied to 
the same diagnostic specification, i.e., 
RC,elH i R!E,~,H, 
iff QeiH (E) E R&,e,H, (E), for each set of observed findings E, given that the diagnoses 
are defined. 
4. Analysis of notions of diagnosis from the literature 
Because the diagnostic formalism introduced above is meant to act as a framework, 
various notions of diagnosis known from the literature should be expressible in it. In this 
section, the expressive power of the framework is examined with respect to abductive and 
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consistency-based diagnosis. Notions of diagnosis related to heuristic classification will 
be examined in the next section. Some obvious properties of notions of diagnosis shall be 
stated without proof (cf. [25] for complete proofs). 
4. I. Abductive diagnosis 
The formalization of diagnosis using causal domain models, usually referred to as 
abductive diagnosis, has been studied by several researchers [9,12,22,30-321. A typical 
example is the work by Console and colleagues [9,12]. In their theory of abductive 
diagnosis, the abnormal or normal behaviour of a system is modelled in terms of causal 
knowledge with abnormal or normal states (called defects in this paper) and predicted 
findings as basic ingredients. Two different types of causal knowledge are distinguished in 
this theory. In the first type of causal knowledge, it is assumed that when a collection of 
defects is present, all causally associated findings must be present as well. This notion of 
causality will be called strong causality. In the second type of causal knowledge, causally 
related findings may be present, but need not be, when the associated defects are present. 
This less strict notion of causality will be called weak causality; it represents an imprecise 
uncertain relationship between cause and effect. We start by analysing diagnostic problem 
solving based on strongly causal knowledge, and next consider the usage of weakly causal 
knowledge and the consequences of combining both types of knowledge. 
Strongly causal relationships among defects, and between defects and observable 
findings, are denoted in the theory of abductive diagnosis by logical implications of the 
form 
dl A... r\d,,+d 
and 
dl r\...r\d,, + f 
expressing that the combined occurrence of defects dl , . . . , dn causes defect d and finding 
f, respectively, to occur; findings f and defects d are represented as ground literals 
in predicate logic. A causal speciJcation C = (A, 0, ‘R), which was already informally 
introduced in Section 2.1, is defined as a set of defect literals A, finding literals @, and 
a collection of logical implications R concerning defect and finding literals of the form 
above. The logical implications in R are often referred to as abnormality axioms, since 
they usually represent causal knowledge of abnormality only. 
Now, let A = (C, E) be an abductive diagnostic problem, with C a causal specification, 
and let E be a set of observed findings. Then, a set of defects H c A is called a diagnosis 
ofdiff[9]: 
(I ) Vf E E: 72 U H b f (covering condition), and 
(2) Vf E EC: R U H F -f (consistency condition) 
where EC, the set of observable findings assumed to be absent, is defined in terms of E as 
follows: 
E’ = {-f E @ 1 f 6 E, f is a positive literal]. 
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This means that a diagnosis H must predict all findings observed, but may not predict 
findings assumed to be absent. 
Example 30. Reconsider the causal specification C = (A, @, R) from Section 2.1, as 
depicted in Fig. 1. Suppose that E = { fl , f2) (fever and sore throat) is a given set 
of observed findings, then we have that EC = (7f3} (dyspnoea is absent), and, thus, 
H = {dl, dz} is a diagnosis for A, because the covering and consistency conditions are 
satisfied. 
This form of abductive diagnosis can be translated into our framework in a straight- 
forward fashion. Let P represent the diagnostic problem corresponding to the abductive 
problem, such that P = t(d), where t maps an abductive diagnostic problem A to a di- 
agnostic problem P in our framework. To distinguish between elements of an abductive 
diagnostic problem A and a diagnostic problem P, subscripts A and P will be attached to 
elements. The meaning of a causal specification C of an abductive diagnostic problem A is 
captured by an evidence function e with domain 83 (Ap) as follows. For each DA E AA: 
(1) if R U DA is satisfiable, then e(Dp) = (t(f) 1 R U DA i= f, f E @A}; 
(2) otherwise, e(Dp) = I, 
where Dp = I. Condition (1) interprets causal knowledge in terms of predicting 
observable findings. 
For ease of exposition, in the following, defects t(d) E Ap and defect literals d E AA 
will not explicitly be distinguished; similarly, no difference is made between findings 
t(f) E @p and finding literals f E @A. 
Example 31. For the axioms R in the example above, the evidence function e of the 
corresponding diagnostic specification .Z = (A, @, e) is given in Example 5. 
Abductive diagnosis as defined above in terms of the covering and consistency 
conditions can now be defined as a notion of diagnosis. The corresponding notion of 
diagnosis is called the notion of strong-causality diagnosis (SC). It is defined as follows: 
SC.+,(E) = 
H if elH(H) = E, 
u otherwise, 
i.e., it is necessary that all observable findings e(H) are observed (consistency condition), 
and vice versa (covering condition), to accept an hypothesis H as a diagnosis. This is just 
expressed by means of equality in our framework. 
Example 32. For the diagnostic problem P = (Z, E), with diagnostic specification Z: as 
in Example 31 and set of observed findings E = (fl, f2], it is concluded that the patient 
has influenza and tracheobronchitis: 
which is exactly the same result as obtained by abductive diagnosis in Example 30. Note 
that for E’ = { fl} no abductive diagnosis exists. Similarly, it holds that SCE,~,~ (E’) = u 
for E’ = [ fl } and every consistent H c A. 
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The notion of strong-causality diagnosis is not diagnostically monotonic, because it may 
hold that SCZ,~,~ (E) = H, but SCC,,,~, (E) = U, for H c H’ (which is easily shown by 
means of a counterexample). The independence assumption also fails to hold for strong- 
causality diagnosis (just take H’ C H, with H = {dl , dz} in the example above). 
A notion of weak causality [9] is arrived at by the addition of assumption literals a! to the 
individual abnormality axioms. These literals are employed to express that a causal relation 
is uncertain. Hence, the abnormality axioms R of an abductive diagnostic problem A are 
of one of the following two forms: 
dl A’.. r\d,r\af+ f 
expressing that the combined occurrence of defects dl, . . . , d,, may cause defect d and 
finding f, respectively, to occur. The transformation t introduced above must be extended 
in order to deal with the assumption literals expressing weak causality. There are two 
possibilities. First, the abnormality axioms ‘R could be translated to an evidence function e, 
where the assumption literals in a solution H are taken as defects, i.e., if for f E E 
and R U H is satisfiable, then f E e(H), where H is a set of defects, possibly including 
assumption literals CX, i.e., d = t’(a), with transformation t’ extending T. and d a defect. 
Next, the notion of diagnosis SC introduced above for strong causality could be employed 
as diagnostic interpretation of the resulting evidence function e. Obviously, weak causality 
is then expressed at the level of the knowledge base, i.e., at the object-level. The second 
possibility amounts to lifting the notion of weak causality to the meta-level: a notion of 
diagnosis is designed that interprets a knowledge base containing causal knowledge as 
being weakly causal in nature. Let A denote the set of assumption literals in Ad. Then, R’ 
is a set of abnormality axioms obtained by removing each assumption literal cz E A from 
the axioms in 77,. The transformation t” is then defined in the same way as t, except that 
R’ replaces 72. 
The theory of abductive diagnosis adopts the first approach, because the same covering 
and consistency conditions are employed to define diagnosis for weakly causal knowledge 
as for strongly causal knowledge. Here, the second approach may also be adopted, i.e., 
uncertainty in causal knowledge is lifted to the level of diagnostic interpretation. 
To study the difference in diagnostic interpretation of evidence functions with respect 
to weak and strong causality, a distinction is made between an abductive solution-a set 
of defects and assumption literals for which the covering and consistency conditions are 
satisfied-and an (abductive) diagnosis, the set of all defects included in an abductive 
solution. 
The notion of diagnosis that corresponds to abductive diagnosis, with weakly causal 
relations as introduced above, is called the notion of weak-causality diagnosis, denoted by 
WC. It is defined as follows: 
WC&,, (E) = I H if elH(H) 2 E, u otherwise. 
A weak-causality diagnosis accounts for all observed findings, although not every 
(predicted) observable finding need be observed. 
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Note that for the notions of diagnosis SC and WC, it holds that 
if Rz,~,~ (E) # u, where R E [SC, WC}, i.e., all findings that have actually been observed 
must have been predicted as being observable for the associated set of defects. This is a 
consequence of the fact that for any abductive diagnosis the covering condition must be 
satisfied. 
We examine the correspondence between abductive diagnosis and the notion of weak- 
causality diagnosis by an example. 
Example 33. Reconsider the abductive diagnostic problem A = (C, E) with the causal 
specification C from Section 2.1, and E = { fl , f2). Assumption literals are added to the 
individual axioms in R, yielding the causal specification C’ = (A’, @, R’), with 77,’ equal 
to: 
dl A cq + d2 
dl A a2 + fi 
d2 A ~3 + f2 
d2r\d3r\a4-+ f3. 
The resulting evidence function is again equal to e as defined in Example 5. 
Now, the set H = (dl , (~1, a~, ~3) is an abductive solution to A’ = (C’, E), because the 
covering and consistency conditions are satisfied; the associated diagnosis is D = (dl}. We 
also have that WCE,~,,~~) (E) = {dl}. 
If we restrict the notion of weak-causality diagnosis to monotonically increasing 
evidence functions, which is similar to restricting to standard logic in the theory of 
abductive diagnosis, the notion of diagnosis WC is diagnostically monotonic. This can 
be shown by noting that if WCE,~,~(E) = H and H’ > H then WCc,,+,,(E) = H’, 
because if elH(H) 2 E then elH/ (H') 2 E, due to the fact that the evidence function e 
is monotonically increasing. Since only part of all observed findings may be accounted 
for by a subset of a set of defects H, where H accounts for all observed findings, the 
independence assumption, however, fails to hold. 
Weak-causality diagnosis can be viewed as a much generalized version of set-covering 
diagnosis as defined in [29]; when an evidence function is assumed to be interaction-free, 
the two notions coincide. 
Until now, weakly and strongly causal knowledge and their use in abductive diagnosis 
have been studied separately. Weak and strong causality diagnosis, however, can also be 
combined to obtain a notion of diagnosis that combines these two different interpretations 
of causal knowledge. Firstly, the evidence function e in a diagnostic specification is split 
up into two evidence functions: 
u:@(A)+ba(@)U]~l 
called the strong evidence function, and 
~:P(A)--+P(@)UI~] 
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called the weak evidencefinction, and the functions v and a! are defined such that 
if v(D), a(D) # I, 
otherwise, 
for each D C A. The set of abnormality axioms with incompleteness assumption literals 
is interpreted by a weak evidence function, again by discarding assumption literals; 
abnormality axioms without assumption literals are interpreted by a strong evidence 
function. 
To capture the joint effect of strong and weak causality on diagnostic problem solving, 
the results of two separate diagnostic functions must be combined. However, diagnostic 
functions capturing abductive diagnosis using strongly causal knowledge or weakly causal 
knowledge each operate on parts of a diagnostic specification. To describe a diagnostic 
specification as consisting of a collection of diagnostic specifications, the notion of 
modularization appears to be convenient. 
Definition 34 (Modularization). A modularization ME of a diagnostic specification 
_E = (A, 0, e) is a finite set of diagnostic specifications Mx = {.X1, . . . , .&I, where 
Ci=(A,@,ei),l<i<n,n>l,suchthatforeachDcA: 
e(D) = yy& ei(D> ifei(D) #I, 1 6 i <n, 
otherwise. 
Modularization of a diagnostic specification is now employed to define the composition 
of two diagnostic functions. 
Definition 35 (Composition of diagnosticfunctions). Let P, Q and R be three notions of 
diagnosis, and let ME = {C’, Z”} be a modularization of the diagnostic specification Z. 
Then, the diagnostic function PE,~,~ is called the composition of Qz,,+ and Rzrr.e~H, 
denoted by 
if it holds that 
for each set of observed findings E s @, and each decomposition E = E’ U Et’ for which 
Q,,,,;, (E’), Rx,,,+ (E”) # U; otherwise Px,,,, (E) = U. 
Observe that the sets E’ and E” resulting from a decomposition of the set of observed 
findings E are neither necessarily disjoint nor unique. Note also that the hypothesis H 
is the same for all diagnostic functions in a composition. This prerequisite ensures that 
possible dependencies among the respective evidence functions e’ and e” are dealt with 
adequately. 
Using the translation scheme and the composition of diagnostic functions, the following 
notion of diagnosis fully captures the theory of abductive diagnosis. The resulting notion 
of diagnosis is called weak-and-strong causality diagnosis, abbreviated to WSC. Let 
328 I? .I. E Lucas /Artificial Intelligence 105 (1998) 295-343 
Fig. 10. Causal net corresponding to C. 
Mz: = {Xv, Z,) be a modularization of a diagnostic specification Z = (A, @, e), where 
.E, = (A, @, u) and & = (A, @, a). The notion of weak-and-strong causality diagnosis, 
denoted by WSC, is defined as follows: 
WS&?l, = SG”,“,H IIWC&,,,H 
where SC is the notion of strong-causality diagnosis, and WC is the notion of weak- 
causality diagnosis. 
Example 36. Consider the following abductive diagnostic problem A = (C, E), with 
causal specification C = (A, @, R), where R is equal to: 
dl A o1 + fi 
d2nd3Aw+f2 
d2 -+ fi 
4 -+ f2 
Ap = {dl, d2, d3, d4), and @p = E = (fl, f2). The causal specification C = (A, @, ‘I?!) is 
graphically depicted in Fig. 10. The following modularization ML: = (&, &) can be 
constructed: C, = (A, 0, u), where the bottom-up partial specification V of u is defined as 
follows: 
1 
M 1 if D = I&), 
V(D) = {f~) if D = (dd), 
0 ifD=(di), i=1,3,orD=(-di), i=l,..., 4. 
Furthermore, 27, = (A, @, cr), where the bottom-up partial specification a! is defined as 
follows: 
I 
Ifi) ifD = M), 
s(D) = 1.M if D = I&, ds), 
0 ifD=(di), i=2,3,4,orD=(-di), i=l,..., 4. 
Since every observable finding in e(D) is positive, only positive findings will be dealt with. 
An example of a diagnostic function comprising the notion of weak-and-strong causality 
diagnosis WSC is 
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Note that, for example, WSCZ,~,,~,,~~~ (0) = u, because SC_z,,v,,,,,,, (0) = u, although 
WC~~,.,,,~,~~~ (0) = {dt, &). Observe also that a set of observed findings E may be 
decomposed among diagnostic functions of WC and SC in several ways. For example, 
4.2. Consistency-based iagnosis 
In consistency-based diagnosis, as proposed in [36] and [18] and introduced in 
Section 2.1, knowledge concerning structure and behaviour of a device is represented as 
a pair S = (SD, COMPS), called a system; when observed findings OBS are included, we 
arrive at what is called an observed system OS = (S, OBS), where 
l SD denotes a finite set of formulae in first-order predicate logic, specifying normal 
structure and behaviour, called a system description, or sometimes also normality 
axioms; 
l COMPS denotes a finite set of constants in first-order logic, denoting the components 
(elements) of the system; 
l OBS denotes a finite set of formulae in first-order predicate logic, denoting 
observations, i.e., observed findings. 
It is, in principle, possible to specify normal as well as abnormal (faulty) behaviour within 
a system description SD. Adding knowledge of abnormal behaviour can be an effective 
means to reduce the number of alternative diagnoses produced [ 181. 
A consistency-based diagnosis is defined as an assignment of either a positive literal 
Abnormal(c) or a negative literal -Abnormal(c) to each c E COMPS, i.e., 
D = {Abnormal(c) ( c E C} U {-Abnormal(c) 1 c E COMPS\C} 
where C C COMPS, such that 
SDUOBSUDFL 
(SD U OBS U D is satisfiable); this condition is called the consistency condition. In the 
formalization by de Kleer et al., each literal Abnormal(c) E D is interpreted as being 
defective; a literals -Abnormal(c) E D indicates component c to be nondefective [ 181. 
In the original theory by Reiter, the set C above is taken as a diagnosis, with the extra 
requirement that C is minimal with respect to set inclusion [36], but note that for each 
component c E C, it holds that Abnormal(c) is true, i.e., c is defective. According to the 
definition of consistency-based iagnosis, taking C = COMPS leads to the trivial diagnosis 
that all components are defective (or the defective components are among the set of all 
components). This explains why Reiter incorporated in the original theory the requirement 
that the set C must be a minimal set with respect to set inclusion, fulfilling the consistency 
condition. However, later it was recognized that minimality according to set inclusion 
is merely a measure of plausibility, which may not be appropriate when knowledge of 
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abnormal behaviour is also included in the system description SD, and the minimality 
criterion was left out of the basic definition. 
Example 37. Consider the system S = (SD, COMPS) from Section 2.1 (Fig. 2). Now, let 
OBS={Zt=l,Z2=O,Z3=1,0t=l,O~=O},then 
D = (-Abnormal(X), Abnormal(A)} 
is a diagnosis, because 
SDUOBSUDYL, 
i.e., consistency has been regained by assuming the AND gate A to be faulty, whereas 
assuming both X and A to be normally functioning, i.e., 
D’ = {-Abnormal(X), -Abnormal(A)} 
yields an inconsistency (SD U OBS U D’ I= -L), indicating that D’ is no diagnosis. 
In [18] the notion of partial diagnosis is introduced, which is a satisfiable set D 
of Abnormal(c) and -Abnormal(c) assignments to part of all the components (the 
abnormality of the remaining components is thus assumed to be unknown), such that the 
consistency condition is fulfilled for every satisfiable superset of D. A kernel diagnosis 
is a partial diagnosis that is minimal with respect to set inclusion, and can be viewed as 
denoting a common diagnostic pattern. 
This notion of diagnosis can be defined in terms of our framework. The resulting notion 
of consistency-based diagnosis, denoted by CB, is defined as follows: 
CBc,e,j, (E) = 1 H if Vf E E: f E e/H(H) V-f $! e/H(H), u otherwise. 
A hypothesis H may also include observable findings as inputs to a system, in which case 
H is a set of assumptions concerning findings and defects. 
Example 38. For the logic circuit in Fig. 2 we have that 
where 1.x means that the XOR gate X is normal and a means that the AND gate A is 
abnormal or faulty (cf. Example 6 for the evidence function e’). This result is analogous 
to the diagnosis in Example 37, obtained by the corresponding logical definition of 
consistency-based diagnosis. 
Without further restrictions with regard to the evidence functions e, the notion of CB di- 
agnosis is neither diagnostically monotonic nor is the independence assumption satisfied. 
However, the independence assumption is satisfied if CB diagnosis is restricted to diagnos- 
tic specifications that are monotonically increasing. As discussed in Section 2, evidence 
functions representing system descriptions are typically monotonically decreasing. If the 
notion of diagnosis CB is defined for such functions, the independence assumption fails to 
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hold, as can be shown by a simple counterexample. The following useful proposition holds 
in case the evidence function is monotonically decreasing. 
Proposition 39. Let P = (C, E), C = (A, @, e), be a diagnostic problem with monoton- 
ically decreasing evidence function e, and let H 2 H’, with H, H’ C A, then if 
CBE,~,,,(E) = D, then CBX,~,,,(E) = D’ with D’ c D. 
Proof. If CBZ,~,,(E) = D then for each f E E: (1) f E elH(H) or (2) -f $ elH(H). If 
condition (1) holds then f E elH’(H’), because e/H(H) C elH’(H’); for the same reason 
from condition (2) it follows that -f $ etH/(H’). q 
In terms of the approach by de Kleer et al. [ 181, from this proposition the existence of a 
partial diagnosis can be derived. 
Corollary 40. Let P = (22, E) be a diagnostic problem, with monotonically decreasing 
evidencejimction e, then if CBC,~,~~~~) (E) = H U Id] and CBC,~,~+~, (E) = H U ]-dl, 
then also CBx,,,, (E) = H. 
In [ 181, the notion of partial diagnosis is provided as a basic definition; it is not derived 
from the notion of diagnosis, as done above. 
4.3. Comparison 
It is informative to relate the notions of diagnosis introduced above to each other in 
terms of the restriction relation & (cf. Definition 28). It is easily seen that the following 
proposition holds. 
Proposition 41. Let SC, WC and CB be the notions of strong-causality, weak-causality 
and consistency-based iagnosis, respectively, then 
SCc:WC&CB. 
Proof. Let P = (C, E) be a diagnostic problem. Simply observe that if WCz,,,, (E) = 
H, then elH(H) = E, therefore, elH(H) 2 E, and WCZ,,,~(E) = H. Furthermore, 
if WCx,,,,(E) = H, then elH(H) 2 E, so for each f E E: f E elH(H). Hence, 
CBc,e,H (E) = H holds. •I 
This reveals that consistency-based diagnosis is a very weak form of diagnosis, 
potentially producing many alternative diagnoses, a well known fact in the diagnosis 
community. 
5. Refinement diagnosis 
Although the diagnostic theories mentioned above differ in several respects, diagnostic 
problem solving can be viewed in all of them as a special instance of hypothetical reasoning 
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[31]. In solving a diagnostic problem, a hypothesis is first generated and next tested with 
respect to diagnostic knowledge and observed findings. If it passes the tests, it is accepted 
and called a diagnosis; when it fails to pass the tests, it is rejected. 
This view of diagnosis is quite general, but it is still unnecessarily restrictive. Instead of 
simply rejecting a hypothesis that does not comply with all requirements, it seems more 
natural to adjust or refine it, when possible. Then, a diagnosis obtained after refinement of 
a hypothesis may be viewed as the best possible solution in a particular sense, given the 
domain knowledge, the set of observed findings and the hypothesis at hand. It therefore 
seems attractive to incorporate a principle of refinement into the basic definition of 
diagnosis, yielding notions of rejinement diagnosis. The study of these notions of diagnosis 
demonstrates the flexibility of the framework of diagnosis defined in Sections 2 and 3. 
There are various reasons why refinement diagnosis may be a more appropriate basis for 
diagnostic problem solving than the more rigorous notions of diagnosis mentioned above: 
l Real-world knowledge bases are, almost without exception, incomplete, i.e., the 
modelled problem domain has not been fully described. For example, knowledge of 
certain interactions among defects may be missing. 
l Real-world knowledge bases are not completely accurate, e.g., the meaning of the 
domain knowledge may not have been captured precisely. 
l The findings that may be observed, and interpreted by a diagnostic system, are only 
part of what might have been collected without limitations, such as available time and 
money. 
l Part of the observed findings may be unreliable, due to impediments to the observation 
process, such as limited available time. 
In many domains, in particular medicine, it is usually better to arrive at a diagnosis that 
does not account for all observed findings, or that suggests findings that have not been 
observed, than to establish no diagnosis at all. It is sometimes said that such a diagnosis 
underaccounts or overaccounts for the set of observed findings. 
The following question now arises: what can be taken as a basis for notions of diagnosis 
which incorporate certain principles of refinement? Obviously, there exists a wide range 
of possibilities. Which of the possible choices yields the most natural result depends, to 
a large extent, on the nature of the problem domain, which is partially expressed by the 
characteristics of the evidence functions e. Dependencies between a notion of diagnosis 
R, on the one hand, i.e., the interpretation of the set of observed findings given a specific 
knowledge base, and properties of a given evidence function e, on the other hand, are of 
importance in this respect. 
Two classes of refinement diagnosis will be studied here. Firstly, the class of notions of 
refinement diagnosis, called most general diagnosis, is examined, where the least upper 
bound of accepted hypotheses (with respect to set inclusion) is taken as a diagnostic 
solution. Secondly, the class of notions of refinement diagnosis, called most specijc 
diagnosis, based on taking the greatest lower bound of accepted hypotheses is studied. 
In most general diagnosis, the smallest set of defects that includes every accepted 
subhypothesis is considered most plausible; in contrast, in most specific diagnosis, the 
largest set of defects that is included in every accepted subhypothesis is considered most 
plausible. 
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5. I. Most general diagnosis 
Notions of most general diagnosis capture the idea that if a specific diagnostic hypothesis 
is not accepted, then the ‘nearest’ subhypothesis should be taken instead. The least upper 
bound with respect to set inclusion of the set of accepted subhypotheses is an example of 
such a ‘nearest’ subhypothesis. 
The notion of most general subset diagnosis, denoted by GS, is defined as follows: 
GSze,, (E) = 
I 
U H’ if H is consistent, and 3H’ C H: ep(H’) s E, 
$$& 
lu otherwise. 
Intuitively, a most general subset diagnosis is the smallest set of defects that includes all 
accepted subhypotheses of a given hypothesis, where an accepted subhypothesis concerns 
observable findings that all have been observed. 
Example 42. Reconsider the causal specification C in Fig. 1 and the corresponding 
evidence function e in Example 5, with E = {fl, f2) (fever and sore throat), we 
have that GSC++, ,d2) (E) = {dl, dz}, which is also an abduct&e diagnosis, because 
SC ~~~~~~~~~~~ (E) = I&, 41. However, it holds that GS_X,~,(~~,~~) Kf2H = Id21, where 
SC z,ell+ ,+, (Vi}> = u. H ence, e({dl, d2)) predicts a finding that cannot be accounted for, 
causing the defect dl to be ignored. This may be a suitable approach to domains in which 
neglecting a particular defect may be dangerous. 
In Fig. 11, the relationship between diagnostic hypothesis H, the set of observed findings 
E and the resulting diagnosis GSZ,,,~ (E) is summarized by schematically depicting 
these sets as if they were real numbers and by taking set inclusion as the < total order 
on the real numbers. If most general subset diagnosis is applied to a monotonically 
decreasing evidence function, the resulting diagnosis is either undefined or equal to 
Fig 
-CA 
GSc,,,,(E) = H GSX~~($= H 
GS c,e,,,(W = H” GS 
GS C,e,*, (E’) = H’ 
L$,,(E’) = H’ 
GS C,elH’ (E) = ‘J, 
(4 (b) 
Il. Monotonically increasing (a) and decreasing (b) evidence functions. 
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the given hypothesis H. This contrasts with GS applied to a monotonically increasing 
evidence function, which may also yield subsets of the hypothesis as a diagnosis. If 
such an evidence function is assumed to represent empirical associations, the notion 
of most general diagnosis may be taken as the formalization of heuristic classification. 
GSE+,, (E) = H ” in Fig. 1 l(a) is intended to illustrate that e(H”) may even be a superset 
of E. If the evidence function e is nonmonotonic, then the relationships between E and 
elH (H’) are investigated as before, but again, certain interactions between defects may be 
ignored. 
The independence assumption is satisfied for GS if GS is restricted to diagnostic 
specifications with a monotonically increasing evidence function, which can be defined 
by a bottom-up partial specification. 
Proposition 43. The independence assumption holds for the notion of diagnosis GS, when 
applied to diagnostic speci@ations with monotonically increasing evidence functions, 
described by a bottom-up partial speci$cation. 
Proof. Let P = (27, E) be a diagnostic problem with monotonically increasing evidence 
function e. Let V C H be a subset of the hypothesis H E A. The powerset p(H) is 
partitioned into the set of sets P for which it holds that for each U E P: U C V, and 
the set of sets P’ for which it holds that for each U E P’: U g V. Then, according to basic 
set theory, it holds that: 
GSc,+, (E) = u H’U u H’. 
H’EP H’EP’ 
qvW’)c~ ~H(H’)G 
The first component of this union can also be written as GSE,~,” (E). Since e is 
monotonically increasing, the sets H’ E P’ may be changed to H” = H’\V, because if 
e(H’) C E, then e(H”) s E, and because H’ fl V & V, the set H’ fl V is considered in the 
diagnosis GSC,~,, (E). Hence, 
GSZ,,,, (E) = GSz.e,v (E) U GS~,qqy (5). 
Since the set V has been selected arbitrarily, GS satisfies the independence assump- 
tion. 0 
However, if the evidence function e is not monotonically increasing, then the indepen- 
dence assumption is not satisfied. Hence, the independence assumption fails to hold in 
general for most general subset diagnosis, as can be shown the a counterexample. How- 
ever, most general subset diagnosis is diagnostically monotonic, as proven in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 44. The notion of most general subset diagnosis GS is diagnostically 
monotonic. 
Proof. If H E H’, then GSZ,=,~(E) C GSX,~,,,(E) given that GSE,~,,(E), GSx+,, (E) 
# u, because if eiH(H”) E E, H” C H, then elH,(H”) E E. 0 
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GOx,e,,(E) = H 
GO 
GO 
~,e,~, (E’) = u 
c,e,,,(E) = H’ 
‘X&(E’) = H 
GO 
GO 
~,e,,,.@‘) = H” 
~,e,#) = H” 
(4 (b) 
Fig. 12. Monotonically increasing (a) and decreasing (b) evidence functions. 
Where most general subset diagnosis can be viewed as a more flexible version of 
strong-causality diagnosis SC, which for certain evidence functions is as little restrictive 
as consistency-based diagnosis, a similar, flexible notion of diagnosis can be designed for 
weak-causality diagnosis. This suggests replacing the subset relation in most general subset 
diagnosis by the superset relation, yielding the notion of most general superset diagnosis 
GO (the letter ‘0’ stands for ‘cOntams’). 
The notion of rrwst general superset diagnosis, denoted by GO, is defined as follows: 
I U H’ if H is consistent, and 3H’ C H: elH(H’) 2 E, GO+,(E) = H’CH qH(*QE 
lu otherwise. 
Most general superset diagnosis has much in common with weak-causality diagnosis WC 
defined in the previous section. If the notion of most general superset diagnosis is applied to 
evidence functions that are monotonically decreasing, or nonmonotonic, for the resulting 
diagnosis GOC,~,~ (E) = H’ it may even hold that e(H’) c E, although for each of the 
diagnostic hypotheses H” E H that contribute to the diagnosis it holds that e/H (H”) 3 E. 
Hence, the situation is the reverse of that for most general subset diagnosis discussed above, 
as might be expected from their respective definitions. In Fig. 12, the various possibilities 
are schematically depicted. The independence assumption is not generally satisfied for 
most general superset diagnosis, but most general superset diagnosis is diagnostically 
monotonic. Both results follow from straightforward modification of Proposition 44. 
As is true for weak-causality diagnosis WC, most general superset diagnosis restricted to 
monotonically increasing evidence functions is very unrestrictive, which is revealed by the 
fact that GOE,~,” (!J) = H if e( H) # I, meaning that all defects constituting the hypothesis 
may have occurred, even if no findings have been observed. Note that the same diagnosis 
would have been produced by weak-causality diagnosis WC in this case. By adopting some 
criterion of parsimony to only select plausible diagnoses (cf. [41]), such as minimality 
according to set inclusion, the unrestrictiveness is alleviated; the empty diagnosis t?J would 
then be produced. 
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An alternative to the definition of subset diagnosis is to consider all sets of defects D 
that have at least one finding f in common with the findings E observed. This leads to the 
following definition of the notion of most general intersection diagnosis, denoted by GI: 
U 
H’ if H is consistent, and (E = 0 
Gke,, (E) = ,,=,v$$,=p~ v 
or 3H’ G H: e/H(H’) = 0 or 
elHW)nW) 
elH(H’) O E # 0), 
otherwise. 
If the sets of observed and observable findings are nonempty, intersection diagnosis with 
respect to H stands for the least upper bound of subsets of defects of H C A, where for 
each subset of defects H’ admitted to the most general intersection diagnosis GIz,,,, (E), 
the associated set of observable findings elH(H’) is empty or has at least one finding in 
common with the set of observed findings E. 
The independence assumption is not satisfied for most general intersection diagnosis, 
which is even true if GI is restricted to interaction-free evidence functions. The reason is 
that if elH(H’) rl E # 0, then it need not be true that for all d E H’: el(dl(d) fl E # 0. Only 
if e(D) = e(D’), for each consistent D, D’ g A (every set of defects has the same set of 
associated findings) would the independence assumption hold. However, if e is interaction 
free, the notion of most general intersection diagnosis restricted to such interaction-free 
evidence functions is diagnostically monotonic. 
The advantage of most general intersection diagnosis over most general subset and 
superset diagnosis is that only defects that have at least one associated observable finding 
that has actually been observed, are included in a diagnosis. This will be an acceptable 
assumption in a domain where not all findings associated with a set of defects need be 
observed and not all observed findings need be accounted for. In representing a domain, it 
may be required to restrict to those observable findings that are in some way ‘typical’ for 
the defects. 
Most general intersection diagnosis can be viewed as a refinement version of a mixture 
of the notions of weak-causality and strong-causality diagnosis. 
5.2. Comparison 
Most general subset, superset and intersection diagnosis are three refinement approaches 
to diagnosis. The restriction relationships between these notions of diagnosis are shown in 
Fig. 13. For most general subset diagnosis, all findings associated with a set of defects 
must be observed if the set of defects is to be included as part of a diagnosis. Most general 




L WC - 
Fig. 13. Restriction taxonomy of notions of diagnosis. 
l?J.E Lucas /Art$cial Intelligence 105 (1998) 295-343 337 
diagnosis, at least one finding associated with a defect must be observed if the defect is to 
be included as part of a diagnosis. Notions of diagnosis can also be classified in terms of 
the subdiagnostic relation i (cf. Definition 29). The three notions of diagnosis discussed 
above stand in a subdiagnostic relation to each other: 
GSaGI 
GO I! GI. 
This follows from the fact that if a set of observed findings is included in the set of 
observable findings associated with a set of defects, or vice versa, the intersection of the 
set of observed findings and observable findings is nonempty, given that neither the set of 
observed findings E, nor the set of observable findings elH(H’), is empty. For the empty 
cases, the most general intersection diagnosis is always equal to the largest result with 
respect to set inclusion of GO and GS. Hence, a most general intersection diagnosis will 
always contain at least as many elements as the corresponding most general subset and 
superset diagnosis. 
5.3. Most speci$c diagnosis 
Rather than taking the least upper bound of a set of accepted subhypotheses of a 
given hypothesis, taking the greatest lower bound provides another approach to refinement 
diagnosis. We shall refer to notions of diagnosis based on taking the greatest lower bound as 
notions of most specific diagnosis. Where the concept of most general diagnosis formalizes 
notions of diagnosis that yield diagnoses that include every accepted subhypothesis, most 
specific diagnosis formalizes notions of diagnosis that yield diagnoses that are common to 
every accepted subhypothesis. In general it holds for a notion of most specific diagnosis 
S that if SE,=,~ (E) = 0 and SE_+,, (E) = H”, then, by definition, SZ,~,~,_, (E) = 0. 
Hence, notions of most specific diagnosis are very restrictive, and neither the independence 
assumption nor diagnostic monotonicity holds. 
As with the notion of most general subset diagnosis, in the notion of most specific subset 
diagnosis, subhypotheses are admitted to a diagnosis if their associated sets of findings 
are included in the set of observed findings of a diagnostic problem. However, of these 
accepted subhypotheses, only the defects the subhypotheses have in common constitute a 
diagnosis. Hence, the notion of most specific subset diagnosis, denoted by SS, is defined 
as follows: 
I n 
H’ if H is consistent, and 3H’ 2 H: elH(H’) C E, 
lu otherwise. 
This notion of diagnosis is extremely restrictive. For example, if an evidence function 
is interaction free, then the most specific subset diagnosis will almost always (with the 
exception when only one subhypothesis is accepted) be equal to the empty set. 
If the evidence function is monotonically decreasing, then most specific subset diagnosis 
tries to construct the smallest diagnosis possible. It may be viewed as a flexible 
form of kernel, consistency-based diagnosis in the sense of [ 181. The reason for the 
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Fig. 14. Multiplier-adder circuit. 
similarity between kernel diagnosis in consistency-based diagnosis and most specific 
subset diagnosis is that any hypothesis H’ for which e]H (H’) C E is also consistent with E. 
The correspondence between kernel diagnosis and most specific subset diagnosis is 
illustrated by an example taken from [ 181. 
Example 45. Consider Fig. 14, which depicts an electronic circuit with three multipliers, 
referred to as Ml, M2 and M3, and two adders, denoted by Al and AZ. When a 
multiplier Mi is behaving normally, it produces as output the product of its two inputs; 
similarly, a normally behaving adder Aj produces as output the sum of its two inputs. Let 
Z = (A, 0, e) be a diagnostic specification representing the circuit. The fact that some 
multiplier Mi is defective, is denoted by rni ; if it is nondefective, this is indicated by lmi. 
A similar notational convention is adopted with regard to the two adders. It is convenient 
to assume that the input to the circuit is fixed (as assumed in [15,1 S]), as indicated in 
Fig. 14. The normal output of the circuit, 01 = 12 and 02 = 12, is denoted by 01 and 02; 
abnormal output is denoted by -oj, j = 1,2. The set of observed findings E is in equal to 
e = {-01,02}, i.e., 01 = 10 # 12 and 02 = 12. 
The following values of the evidence function e are among those that correspond to the 
circuit’s normal behaviour: 
e(]-ml, -m2, -m3, -@I, -a21) = @1,021 
e((-ml, -m2, -m3, al, -a21) = (021 
e(I-ml, -m2, -m3, ~1, ~21) = fl 
e({-ml, -m2, -m3, ~11) = (021 
e(blI) = I021 
e({-ml, -m2, -m31) = (01,mI 
e(0) = {01,021. 
(e(0) denotes that it is unknown whether defects are present or absent.) The most specific 
subset diagnosis with respect to the hypothesis H = {al ) is equal to 
SSE,e,(o,) (ml ,021) = {a11 
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which is indeed a kernel diagnosis for the diagnostic problem P = (22, E) using con- 
sistency-based diagnosis. Note that 
SSZ,e,fj ({‘013 021) = Iall 
if at E H, when for the other kernel diagnoses it holds {ml}, (yn2, mg], (m2, ~2) g H, for 
example, 
H = {-ml, -m2, -mJ,al, 7~2). 
As discussed above, most general superset diagnosis will often yield a diagnosis 
that contains too many defect elements, in particular when an evidence function is 
monotonically increasing. Most specific superset diagnosis is a more restrictive, and 
possibly more suitable, notion of diagnosis than most general superset diagnosis. 
The notion of most specfic superset diagnosis, denoted by SO, is defined as follows: 
n H’ if H is consistent, and 3H’ E H: el,y(H’) 2 E, 
SOc.e,H (E) = H’CH 
e,,dH’)IE 
u otherwise. 
If the evidence function to which most specific superset diagnosis is applied, is 
monotonically increasing, the result may be intuitively attractive. The basic idea of most 
specific superset diagnosis is that the observed findings that are common to the accepted 
subhypotheses are due to the common defects of accepted subhypotheses. 
Example 46. Reconsider Fig. 1. For E = (f2, f3) (i.e., the patient has sore throat and 
dyspnoea), the most specific superset diagnosis is equal to 
because, it holds that ejH({dl,d3}) 2 E, el,y((d2,d3]) 1 E and ei,y((dl,dz,d3)) 2 E, 
where H = {dl, d2, d3). All other subsets of H have associated sets of findings that are 
no supersets of E. The defect d3 stands for asthma. While both d I and d2 participate 
in subhypotheses that also account for E, only the defect d3 occurs in all accepted 
subhypotheses, i.e., it turns out to be essential. It seems therefore intuitively right to accept 
d3 as the most plausible diagnosis. 
As the example above indicates, a most specific superset diagnosis need not account for 
all observed findings on the basis of the given evidence function. If an evidence function 
is interaction free, then most specific superset diagnosis is likely to produce a singleton set 
diagnosis for a given hypothesis that is very plausible if the associated sets of observed 
findings e({d}) are mutually disjoint. 
As discussed above, the notion of most general intersection diagnosis is very unrestric- 
tive. All defects that, either individually or in combination with other defects, have findings 
in common with the set of observed findings, are included in a diagnosis. The notion of 
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most specijic intersection diagnosis, denoted by SI, is much more restrictive than most 
general intersection diagnosis; it is defined as follows: 
f-l H’ if H is consistent, and (E = 0 or 
Size,, (E) = 
H’CH 
(E=OvqH(H’)=O v 
3H’ C H: q,y(H’) = 0 or 
elFf(fm~#0) 
qH(H’) n E # fl), 
otherwise. 
If the evidence function e is monotonically increasing, the resulting diagnosis will be 
equal to the empty set if the function values e({d)) have many observable findings in 
common. 
5.4. Comparison 
Although the notions of most specific diagnosis are very restrictive, they do not stand in 
a simple restriction relation to the other notions of diagnosis. However, it is easy to see that 
SSz,,,, (E) g GSz,e,H (E) 
holds for each consistent H C A. Similar set inclusion relations hold for the other notions 
of diagnosis. We state without proof that: 
SSgGS 
SOiGO 
SI a GI. 
6. Discussion 
In this paper, a theory of diagnosis has been developed which considers a diagnosis 
yielded by a diagnostic problem solver as an established relationship between interpreted 
domain knowledge and a hypothesis. The resulting framework is suitable to express static 
aspects of diagnosis, i.e., diagnosis without taking problem-solving strategies into account. 
It is inspired by the work on abductive diagnosis by Reggia et al. [29] and Bylander 
et al. [5], but offers a significant extension to that work. In fact, as has been shown 
above, these theories of abductive diagnosis amount to particular choices in our theory 
of diagnosis. 
The framework of diagnosis proposed in this paper supports two different views. On the 
one hand, given some intuitively appealing interpretation of knowledge, expressed by an 
evidence function, a notion of diagnosis can be designed, or selected, that adheres to that 
meaning as closely as possible. On the other hand, applying a particular notion of diagnosis 
to solve a diagnostic problem implies that a particular (diagnostic) meaning is given to the 
associated evidence function. It was shown that well known notions of diagnosis from the 
literature are expressible in terms of the framework, and that it is suitable as a tool for 
the analysis and comparison of notions of diagnosis. Furthermore, several new notions 
of diagnosis have been proposed that are less rigorous in dealing with observed findings 
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and diagnostic knowledge than common notions of diagnosis, which give up too soon, 
e.g., when a single element among the set of observed findings cannot be accounted for. 
However, these are certainly not the only notions of diagnosis that may be useful in certain 
domains. 
The literature on diagnosis contains a number of other approaches to diagnosis. In 
particular, logic has been a popular language for the analysis of diagnosis, yielding a 
number of different logical notions of diagnosis, like abductive and consistency-based 
diagnosis [ 12,18,32,36,42]. These logical notions of diagnosis have usually been designed 
in close connection with specific domain models, such as causal models or models of 
structure and behaviour, and, hence, can be applied in a natural way to deal with specific 
diagnostic problems only. Although several researchers have demonstrated their theory 
of diagnosis to be more general than orginally thought [12,18,32,36], there remains a 
close link between a specific theory and problem type. In contrast, in our framework, 
there is no intimate connection between the theory and any of the existing conceptual 
models of diagnosis. In fact, the meaning of a knowledge base, described by means of an 
evidence function e, is completely separated from its diagnostic use. Of course, it is usually 
desirable to define notions of diagnosis that closely mirror the meaning of a knowledge 
base. Furthermore, where in other frameworks, modelled behaviour has to satisfy certain 
constraints, like monotonicity due to the monotonic nature of standard logical entailment, 
there are no such prerequisites in our framework, and many types of subtle interaction can 
be expressed. 
We have focussed on qualitative methods for diagnostic problem solving, but in a 
considerable number of papers, diagnostic problem solving is essentially viewed as a form 
of reasoning with uncertainty, using specific quantitative measures of uncertainty. A typical 
example of such work is the usage of probabilistic networks, also called Bayesian belief 
networks, for diagnostic problem solving [ 1,20,28,39]. However, by a straightforward 
extension, the framework proposed in this paper can also cover such probabilistic 
diagnostic systems: Charniak and Shimony [7], and Santos and Santos [37,38], have shown 
that set-covering theory can be moved in a probabilistic direction, by the concept of cost- 
based abduction. This amounts to associating a prior cost function with sets of defects and 
findings, and updating cost information during abductive reasoning. Then, to any diagnosis 
produced, a cost will be attached. The cost of a diagnosis may be anything, varying from 
financial costs to some subjective feeling of importance expressed by numbers. However, 
Chamiak and Shimony choose as a semantics of cost function information for the negative 
logarithm of probabilities. Under this interpretation, a minimal-cost diagnosis is identical 
to a most probable diagnosis using probabilistic networks [7]. 
A limitation of the framework presented here is that, as a tool for the semantical 
analysis of diagnosis, the framework is rather extensional in nature. This is in contrast 
with the more intensional nature of logic-based techniques for the analysis of diagnosis, as 
commonly used in consistency-based and abductive diagnosis, which allow for the separate 
specification of knowledge of structure and function, and for the easy composition of a 
knowledge base, just by putting parts together. Despite this limitation, it is the extensional 
nature of the formalism that forces one to think explicitly about interactions among defects 
and findings, and much insight can be gained in this way. 
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